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Abstract 
Despite the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) more 
than 30 years ago, the construction industry is in conflict with itself.  It is locked in a 
struggle to effectively keep its workforce protected from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, 
or a combination of both. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), nearly 6.5 
million people work at approximately 252,000 construction sites across the United States 
every day, with the fatal injury rate for the construction industry higher than the national 
average when compared to all industries. There have been many studies documenting 
these conditions, but no study has examined leadership styles and their impact on the 
climate of safety. This study examined the relationship between management’s leadership 
style and the perception of a climate of safety; the relationship between workers’ 
perception of leadership style and the perception of a climate of safety; and the 
relationship between the size of the workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and the 
perception regarding the climate of safety. The outcomes contribute to the field of 
conflict resolution as they offer the ability to move from incongruities regarding 
perceived worker safety to discussions and solutions that are aimed at influencing those 
policies and procedures at the organizational level that will ensure that a construction 
worker can perform his or her job free from dangerous work conditions.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The construction industry has long been recognized as hazardous (Chen & Jin, 
2012; Cooper, 2000; Dester & Blockley, 1995). Nearly 6.5 million people work at 
approximately 252,000 construction sites across the United States, and, according to the 
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (2012), approximately 17% were construction 
workers who became catastrophically or fatally injured because of unsafe job site 
conditions.  This is the largest number of injuries incurred in any industry in America, 
reflecting a fatal injury rate that is higher than the national average across all industries 
(Occupational Health and Safety Administration [OSHA], 2005). 
The objective of this study is to explore underlying factors that may contribute to 
workplace injuries by examining the leadership styles, organizational size, and whether 
workers and managers are in agreement regarding perceived climate of safety. While not 
expected to have a working knowledge of safety practices, or the ability to analyze data 
to ensure that the most effective and efficient safety practices are best utilized, managers 
do have a responsibility to protect their workers. They also should be familiar with the 
latest advancements in the industry. 
As an example, Teo, Ling, and Chong (2005) recognized that construction 
companies are systemic in nature and as such, sensitive to shifts in organizational 
paradigms that create a continuous need to balance production deadlines and worker 
safety.  This focus on the potential between these two organizational forces creates an 
ongoing conflict between the management of time and the management of job site safety. 
This systemic conflict is therefore a seminal missing link in safety supervision best 
2 
 
understood as a struggle and an obstacle that must be understood and addressed. It has 
historically manifested as management’s inability to effectively execute safety policies 
and protocols as well as an unwillingness to recognize safety as a priority and emphasize 
it as such when interacting with the frontline worker.  Walton (1989) acknowledged that 
management must recognize that the foundation of this organizational conflict is also 
rooted in the reality that they (management) holds both the power and obligation 
regarding worker’s behaviors. Therefore, it is vital for management at every level of the 
construction industry to implement an unwavering dedication to the identification, 
prevention, and administration of jobsite hazards, risks, and accidents by guaranteeing 
that the correct benchmarks and goals are implemented with the sole purpose of 
alleviating unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both. 
Another factor also drives organizational conflict, specifically relating to safety 
hazards and resource allocation (Cervo, Allen, & Dyché, 2011). While large companies 
have the ability to invest in the implementation of expensive safety management systems, 
smaller companies have limited resources, which can often lead management to assume 
that they lack the necessary ability to create, implement, and monitor a means of 
formalized safety management.  This can manifest in the lack of a dedicated personnel or 
team devoted to worker safety. As a result, injuries and fatalities occur (Gillen, Baltz, 
Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002).  A lack of experience dealing with safety issues is also 
problematic for small businesses. John Mendeloff (2006), Director of the RAND Center 
for Health and Safety in the Workplace, argues this is the case because smaller 
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companies may not possess the same level of knowledge, including different options in 
management styles they relate to worksite safety.   
As an example, Company A has 15 employees; 3 are in a supervisory position 
with safety related responsibilities and the remaining 12 are skilled workers (carpenters, 
plumbers, electricians, etc.) and general laborers. While this company recognizes safety 
as a priority, only the 3 supervisors actively engage in trainings focused on keeping the 
worker safe. In comparison, Company B also recognizes safety as a priority but has 150 
employees, with 30 of them holding supervisory positions with safety related 
responsibilities. The remaining 120 are skilled workers (carpenters, plumbers, 
electricians, etc.) and general laborers. Understanding that safety must be a priority, 30 
employees actively engage in trainings focused on keeping the worker safe. 
In this scenario, both companies prioritize safety; both have supervisors actively 
engaged in safety trainings used to increase their ability to keep the worker safe; but, as 
articulated by Mendeloff (2011), Company B has 10 times the opportunities to learn, 
implement, reinforce, and assess acquired safety related knowledge, whereas Company A 
has only 3 times that amount. To this end, construction safety management and the ability 
to keep the worker safe is impacted by company size. 
Therefore, recent studies on workplace construction safety have emphasized the 
need for an integrated safety management approach, which demands a recognition that at 
the highest level of the systemic paradigm, (the construction industry), a recognition must 
be made that the organizational conflict is real and based in a historical inability to 
integrate macro-level directives such as policies and procedures into mezzo- and micro-
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level initiatives that keep the worker safe. For instance, Choudhry, Fang, and Mohamed 
(2007) advocated for a multi-faceted paradigm, one that focused not only on the reaction 
to accidents after they have occurred, but also strong proactive approaches such as hazard 
identification and observation. These approaches are all rooted in a quantifiable 
percentage of safety policies, protocols, and behaviors and have been instrumental for 
bringing about the necessary organizational changes to support an enduring commitment 
to safety.  
Current Challenges to Worker Safety 
Micro, mezzo, and macro levels and safety challenges 
Recent studies on workplace construction safety have emphasized the need for an 
integrated safety management approach involving macro, mezzo, and micro-level 
directives.  These studies all reflect a common theme of construction being an industry in 
both crisis and conflict with a need to see the systemic disconnect not only mirrored in 
the interdependent relationship between managers and workers, but also between the 
industry as whole and those specifically tasked with keeping the worker safe. Caldwell 
and Mays (2012) understood this and expressed it as a need to start at the broadest level, 
the macro level, including policies and procedures that are found in the construction 
contracts and subcontracts.  When discussing the macro-level, it is important to note that 
these forces are established at the highest level of the management hierarchy as a means 
of creating a clear and concise blueprint upon which all safety decisions are implemented, 
reinforced, and monitored. When operationalized correctly, these initiatives create a 
strong systemic culture and climate of safety, thereby establishing an information loop 
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between management and the worker. Much like interpersonal interactions, macro-level 
relationships are based on communication. This communication becomes the foundation 
upon which expectations are prioritized, as they are codified in writing with clearly 
delineated outcomes, leaving no room for interpretation (Parboteeah and Kappa, 2008). 
In turn, the mezzo level can be best understood as a framework where broad 
macro level policies begin to take focus in an effort to manifest as explicit programs and 
practices.  At this level, construction safety practices are communicated to management 
professionals with a specific range of expected deliverables. As a transitional stage, this 
framework is often at risk for the greatest level of misunderstandings or 
misinterpretations, leaving the worker at greater risk (Caldwell & Mays, 2012).   
The micro level involves the worker who is at the greatest risk of harm and who is 
impacted by this industry in organizational conflict. To that end, it must be built upon 
strong macro and mezzo levels. All prior levels of safety initiatives are translated to the 
worker at this level.  In other words, the policy (macro) is expressed as a program 
(mezzo) into day-to-day work tasks (micro).  This progression is shaped by an 
organizational structure that must be driven by a cohesive and codified approach that is 
unilaterally adopted by the construction industry and is ultimately the best proactive 
approach, that of a shared safety narrative that involves both a top down and bottom up 
approach, giving the worker a voice (perception of safety) in the process, while still 
acknowledging that safety must be codified, communicated, and enforced from the top 
down as it relates to job site safety (Clarke, 2013).    
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The complexity of construction safety management and the inclusion of multiple 
trades and multi-organizational collaboration in the construction industry continue to 
exist and, as a result, the presence of a high potential to systemically impede the creation 
of an effective means of understanding the impact of management styles on the day-to-
day activities that comprise climate of safety is also evident (Rowlinson, 2004). This can 
be overcome with a commitment by the industry to encourage both managers and 
workers to engage in simple surveys designed to better understand how the safety 
information loop, that of a top down, bottom up approach is instituted, communicated, 
and arguably most importantly perceived by the frontline worker (Zohar, 1980a; 
Mohamed, 2003; Ng, Roger, & Yip, 2009; Lunt, Bates, Bennett, & Hopkinson, 2008). 
These frameworks are instrumental for bringing about the necessary 
organizational changes that support an enduring commitment to safety and the day-to-day 
operationalization necessary to protect the worker. It is for these reasons that Choudhry et 
al. (2007) advocate for a multi-faceted paradigm focusing on the strong proactive 
approaches such as hazard identification and observation.  Each of these is rooted in a 
quantifiable percentage of safety policies, protocols, and behaviors from the macro to the 
mezzo and ultimately in the day-to-day jobs carried out by the worker at the micro-level. 
Therefore, the first step is to identify key personnel characteristics and attributes 
including observable behaviors that promote safety, judicious responses to safety 
issues, approaching safety proactively, and effective communication skills allowing 
each to serve individually and collectively to enhance and support a strong climate of 
safety. This is accomplished by a commitment by management to integrate reliable 
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scales and measures as part of emerging construction safety management research 
(Le Coze, 2013; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000). 
The 2007-2010 Recession and Safety Violations 
Another factor that has impacted the climate and culture of safety is the most 
recent economic downturn. The nationwide recession in the United States spanning the 
period of 2007 to 2010 had a strong impact on the construction industry.  Since the 
construction industry is a cyclical process with episodic expansions and marked 
contractions, the recession was an important factor impacting how the industry reacted to 
worker safety. During this period, the immense decrease in overall construction projects 
was often overlooked, leading to a distorted version of injuries, lost time, and worker 
deaths.  This distortion was driven by a focus on the frequency of accidents without fully 
taking into account the severity of injuries, a misrepresentation of the safety narrative that 
continues to persist in present day, creating a gap in understanding the true impact on the 
lives on those injured at the job site (Mendeloff, 2006).   
This is important since the industry uses the decrease in lost time injuries as a 
benchmark to prove that it is adequately addressing safety issues. Unfortunately, this 
logic is flawed since the loss of over 1.5 million jobs would offer a more realistic reason 
for the decrease (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). 
The construction industry is not getting safer, as is apparent in the most recent 
report of The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) documenting increases in the number of 
fatal work injuries, the highest annual total since 2008. As such, the industry and those at 
the highest levels of the managerial hierarchy should not approach safety management 
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using preexisting models, but rather the focus should be on those that support new 
research and insights that promote worker safety. 
To that end, safety has been the focus of the industry, but acknowledgement as an 
organization is not enough to address and solve the conflict as it has only been shown to 
be a small part of the larger solution (Gillen et. al, 2002). Instead, macro and mezzo level 
entities—specifically general contractors, sub-contractors, and safety supervisors—must 
be supported by the industry to offer tangible means of operationalizing policy and 
protocol at the executive level so that it may be put into day-to-day practice regarding 
safety management (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). 
Management Styles and Safety Challenges  
There are three general leadership styles that have been recognized across the 
continuum of all areas of Occupational Safety and Health but have rarely been 
applied to the construction industry. Guldenmund, (2007); Zohar, (1980a); Katz & 
Kahn, (1978); Hammer, (1989); Gillen et. al., (2002); Demirkesen & Arditi, (2015); and 
Cooper (2000) all agree that these are best reflected in the precepts of the autocratic 
leadership style, participatory leadership style, and free rein leadership style. 
Autocratic Leadership Style 
The aforementioned researchers each found that in this model, there is one leader 
who has complete command over his/her employees/team.  Individual input is not part of 
this model, nor is criticism of the way in which the person in charge decides is best to 
“get the job done”.  While some have argued that the advantage of this style is the ability 
to make quick decisions leading to greater productivity, safety on the construction job site 
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can be greatly undermined if decisions are not well thought out and driven by pre-
planning strategies, especially those safety policies mandated by the contract. 
Participatory Leadership Style 
The researchers each found that in this model, those in charge foster an 
environment that encourages a sense of teamwork, with each member from the top down 
and bottom up having the ability and responsibility to take part in the decision-making 
process, with the ultimate decisions made by the leader after all opinions and ideas are 
considered. Those in charge direct the workers regarding job tasks and expectations and 
workers have the freedom to communicate any concerns or suggestions without fear of 
negative repercussions. The advantages of this leadership style are reflected in an 
increase in worker motivation and a willingness to accept top down decisions as they feel 
they reflect their input. Critics argue it is too time-consuming. Yet, when worker safety is 
the priority, this form of input from the worker has proven integral and in the event that a 
decision needs to be made quickly to avoid immediate hazards, leadership still has the 
ultimate power to do so. 
Free Rein Leadership Style 
The researchers each found that this model is built upon complete trust that the 
worker will perform the job with little to no supervision. In traditional corporate settings, 
this leadership style works only when the employees are skilled, loyal, experienced, and 
intellectual.  While the construction worker can be all of these things, safety is not 
something that can be left solely to the worker, as top down, bottom up leadership often 
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includes certain expertise and access to high-level policies and procedures as well as the 
construction contract that the worker does not possess. 
While every worker deserves a work environment free of unsafe acts, unsafe 
conditions, or a combination of both, the construction industry, unlike a traditional office 
setting, poses greater safety related challenges (Wamuziri, 2007). The relationship 
between culture and climate of safety and the role leadership styles play can be a 
powerful analytical tool; yet to date, the exploration of relationships between 
leadership style and a worker’s perceived notion of his/her climate of safety has 
been sorely underutilized. 
Significance of Study 
For decades, the construction industry, as reflected in organizational 
systemics, has failed to see itself as the key stakeholder and the agent of change 
regarding worker safety. The industry has focused on applying technologies that 
support outcomes regarding the estimating and overseeing of projects; yet in an 
attempt to fully integrate these mechanisms, it has failed to address one of the most 
significant aspects of the industry, worker safety (Niskanen, 1994). Project 
management continues to impact the success or failure of a project, but if success is 
to be defined by the industry as well as by individual construction companies only on 
the basis of time, cost, or quality performance without making worker safety the first 
priority, the true impact of the completion of any project lacks an integral dimension, 
that of the relationship between leadership styles and climate of safety. 
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This research takes a unique approach insofar as it endeavors to highlight new 
ways in which to approach construction safety management by exploring the construction 
industry’s need to realize it is both in crisis and conflict.  This systemic dissonance 
impacts management’s approach to worker safety based on perceived notions of climate 
of safety by not only management, but also the worker.  Therefore, by recognizing the 
industry as part of ongoing organizational conflict, this holds it responsible not only for 
the problem/conflict but more importantly as a key contributor to the facilitation of 
potential solutions.  This innovative approach fills the gap in the study of construction 
safety by connecting the missing dots revealed in past research; specifically, by focusing 
on the need for a proactive approach that includes the analysis of primary data, notably 
that of those in charge of keeping the construction job site safe at the managerial level, as 
well as those performing the daily work tasks (Smith, Foklard, Tucker, & 
Macdonald.1998; Shapira & Lyachin, 2009; Parboteeah & Kapp, 2008; Niskanen, 1994). 
This cannot be done from a strictly retroactive approach using broad strokes to 
explain specific catastrophic and fatal injuries (Mohamed, 2003; Mattila, Rantanen, & 
Hyttinen,1994). Instead, the important role both worker and management play in safety 
outcomes is the ultimate goal; and while in no way predictive in nature, this research led 
to increasing awareness and in turn offered greater options when deciding upon the most 
effective and efficient means and methods to be utilized by management to protect the 
worker from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both.   
Managerial leadership styles are key to propelling the industry forward into a new 
age of construction safety management. Management has a multi-faceted role, and as 
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such, while there has been no lack of research focused on the goals of how those in 
charge can utilize time and cost-saving methods, far less exists regarding proactive 
safety approaches based on leading rather than lagging indicators (Tsui, A.S., Zhang, 
Z.X., Wang, H., Xin, K.R., & Wu, J.B. 2006) 
 The research regarding the relationship between leadership styles and climate of 
safety is still in its infancy, but it remains integral to the future of construction safety 
management and the systemic approach to keeping the worker safe. There is no doubt 
that by keeping safety systems healthy and responsive, they can appropriately adapt to the 
changing needs of both the workplace and the workforce they are created to protect 
(Clarke, 2013; Checkland,1997; Flin et al., 2000). To that end, the industry has an 
organizational and systemic choice to make as it endeavors to offer more than simply 
awareness of the need for worker safety, but also an active commitment to making safety 
not merely an afterthought, but a driving force in all decisions across the construction 
management continuum.  This opportunity is in concert with those forces that drive the 
field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, allowing for the emergence of an informed 
industry that recognizes and values worker safety that acknowledges not enough is being 
done to keep the worker safe. As the highest tier of the organizational hierarchy, it has the 
greatest responsibility to establish and empower leaders/managers who are better 
equipped to understand the needs of workers. This in turn allows for the creation of a 
much-needed bridge between an industry focused on production driven outcomes that 
cannot supersede the appreciation that with a clearer comprehension of workers’ 
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perception of climate of safety comes the potential for a reduction in workplace 
conflict(s) as well as an overall diminution of safety related anxieties. 
Statement of Problem 
The construction industry can be hazardous (Chen and Jin, 2012; Cooper, 2000; 
Dester and Blockley,1995). However, management has historically approached the issue 
of safety assessment from a reactive nature such as safety updates, retraining, and re-
certifications. These assessments are a response to an accident rather than a means of 
trying to prevent a new one from occurring (Celik & Cebi, 2009). 
While there has been a small shift away from the reactive measures, the new 
policies and standards, including OSHA’s confined spaces, fall prevention campaign, and 
investigation and reporting reflect a historical focus on retrospective information or data 
conventionally referred to as "lagging indicators” (Demirkesen & Arditi, 2015). This is 
inadequate because historical data can only offer a snapshot into the climate of safety, 
and in turn, accident causation as it relates to the worker, the construction milieu, and the 
context surrounding the particularly hazardous environment (Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, & 
Smith-Crowe, 2002; Celik & Cebi, 2009; Diaz & Cabrera,1997). 
While the construction industry may not always agree regarding the means and 
methods to effectively measure safety, for nearly two decades, setting safety goals and 
measuring safety performance has continued to engender controversy and varying 
opinions regarding the way in which safety outcomes should be expressed empirically. 
To that end, it is important to point out that prior to the creation of OSHA, 
American Nation Standards Institute (ANSI) Z16.1 put forth three distinct measures of 
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injury experience: disabling industry frequency rate, disabling injury severity rate 
(essentially a weighted frequency rate), and average days associated for disabling injury 
(a measurement of the ratio of severity to frequency rates).  In their simplest form, these 
afforded the BLS the ability to collect, record, and code work injuries within each of the 
categories. The goal was one that focused on creating a system based on uniformity. 
Unfortunately, since reporting was voluntary, unlike mandatory reporting imposed by 
OSHA, ANSI data was unable to produce an accurate accounting of both the quality and 
degree of workplace injuries (Grayson, Althouse, Winn, & Klishis, 1998). 
With the emergence of OSHA, many safety and health professionals have adopted 
measures based on statistically driven formulas that in their simplest form are generated 
by an empirical foundation that uses a base formula of 100 full-time employees per year 
or 200,000 work hours to measure safety outcomes. This is simply not effective because 
it does not take into account the frequency of accidents on a specific job site in 
comparison to the severity of injuries that resulted. Trying to show that a company is 
working more safely simply due to a decrease in frequency without taking into 
consideration severity is misleading at best.   
Take the fatality rates of two hypothetical companies. Company A reported 250 
broken arms and 3 deaths for a particular year, while Company B reported 900 broken 
arms with 0 deaths for that same time period. The following year, Company A reported 
100 broken arms (a decrease of 150 broken arm incidents) and 15 deaths, while Company 
B reported 925 broken arms (an increase of 25 broken arm incidents) and 0 deaths.   The 
industry would report, based on frequency, that Company A has recognized greater 
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success in keeping the workers safe due the overall decrease in accidents.  Yet, OSHA 
incident rates were never intended to be utilized so exclusively. Time and again, OSHA 
experts have explained that the United States government created OSHA for many 
reasons, one of which was to build a very narrow window or “snapshot” of occupational 
safety and health as it related to injuries in the workplace. Still, these guidelines were 
never meant to give an accurate accounting of safety to the exclusion of all other data 
sources. The industry would report and recognize that company A has recognized greater 
success in keeping the worker safe due the overall decrease in accidents. 
The study of any mass data reveals that the type of accidents, specifically ones 
that results in temporary total disabilities, are far different from those that result in 
permanent partial disabilities, permanent total disabilities, or death. This is the challenge 
faced by construction safety management professionals today and in the future. It is also 
the challenge faced by educators, as those entering into the workforce charged with the 
responsibility of worker safety need to have a far greater understanding of lagging and 
leading indicators and their relationship to the evaluative process of construction safety 
management. Therefore, lagging indicators tend to be highly ineffective as they only 
address the root cause after the injury has occurred rather than focusing on the leading 
indicators or those that keep the worker safe (Shapira, A., and Lyachin, B. 2009). 
The movement away from what has been traditionally deemed a "feedback” 
model in construction safety management to that of a "feed-forward" still remains 
misunderstood. Furthermore, the “feed-forward” model has been applied incorrectly. For 
example, an electrocution of a worker would be a lagging indicator as it has already 
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occurred, whereas an inspection of the jobsite for hazards related to electrocution would 
be a leading indicator, reflecting a pre-incident measurement. Subsequently, safety 
management initiatives must be laser focused and built upon outcome-oriented tasks, 
which can be easily integrated into an already existing management structure. Equally 
important, workers must be involved in safety management in order for the system to 
function properly. This integrated safety management or programs are based on proven 
outcomes that work because they involve the worker in the problem-solving processes, 
thus allowing for an increase in safety behaviors which support a top down/bottom up 
approach to safety (Zohar, 1980a; Zohar, 1980b). 
Need for Study 
The importance of this study is in its focus on indicators that transcend decades of 
awareness building regarding job site safety on the part of the construction industry as 
well as macro-level systemic rhetoric that alludes to the need for management to have the 
information to employ effective and efficient proactive safety monitoring strategies, 
rather than relying on lagging indicators to predict workplace safety that does nothing to 
further the necessary safety narrative to make this a reality.  As discussed, this is 
accomplished by examining the potential impact of the relationship between 
management’s leadership styles and their perception of the climate of safety as well as 
those of the worker. While previous studies have demonstrated a strong connection 
between leadership styles and performance outcomes, no one in the construction industry 
has taken the initiative to look specifically at the perception of both management and the 
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worker by applying the same quantitative scales and measures (Bogdanov, 1980; Brown 
& Holmes, 1986; Cervo, Allen, & Dyché, 2011; Diaz & Cabrera,1997).    
By examining these factors, construction safety management is taken in a new 
and necessary direction with the focus of finding the relationships between proactive 
approaches and keeping the worker safe. Owing to the multi-faceted nature of the 
construction industry and the polycentric construct especially found on the multi-
employer worksite, research must focus on the interplay between the various entities 
responsible for safety.  
To that end, it is important to understand the basic underpinning of The Multi-
Employer Doctrine governing the construction worksite (Fonte & Griffin, 2012).  It is 
defined as any jobsite consisting of more than one employer and as such, on these 
jobsites the Prime Contractor, General Contractor or any other employer or a mixture 
thereof can be cited for a hazardous condition that violates an OSHA standard. Under the 
law, “General contractors can be held liable for OSH Act violations even if they did not 
create or expose their own employees to the hazard” (OSHA, 2016) 29 C.F.R. 
§1910.12(a)). This provides in part, that “each employer shall protect the employment of 
each of his employees engaged in construction work by complying with the appropriated 
standards’" (Fonte & Griffin, para. 5). 
The construction industry has not ignored worker safety, but it has relied upon 
outdated modes of measuring the efficacy of models of intervention, training, and an 
overall change across the continuum of occupational safety and health regarding primary 
data sources, leading indicators, and the construction job site being systemic in nature 
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(Jackson, 2001), leaving each part highly susceptible to influence and impact by those 
other parts that make up the entire system. 
Research Questions 
This purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the climate of 
safety as it relates to leadership style. Specifically, three areas of focus are of interest: 
management’s leadership style and perception of climate of safety; worker’s perception 
of leadership style and the climate of safety; and the interaction between size of the 
workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and their perception regarding the climate of 
safety. These research questions were:  
Is there a relationship between management’s leadership style and perception of 
climate of safety?  
Is there a relationship between worker’s perception of leadership style and climate 
of safety?  
Is there a relationship between the size of the workforce, the manager’s leadership 
style, and their perception regarding the climate of safety?   
The researcher hypothesized that those leaders who engage in a more 
participatory leadership style will be more attuned to climate of safety when compared to 
autocratic leaders.  He also believed that those workers who perceived their supervisors 
to engage in a more participatory leadership style would have a perception of a stronger 
climate of safety than those who ascribed to either an authoritarian or free rein style.  
Furthermore, he believed that company size would impact the perception of climate of 
safety on the part of both the supervisor and worker.  
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Definition of Terms 
There are several terms utilized throughout this dissertation that are important to 
explain. 
Culture of safety. When defining a culture of safety, specifically as it pertains to 
the construction jobsite, it is not a single construct, but instead a top down/bottom up 
approach consisting of shared organizational beliefs, policies, and procedures that have 
been codified at the macro level. Culture of safety is the construct that ultimately shapes 
management and employee behavior. 
Climate of safety. While a subpart of culture of safety, climate of safety is 
experienced at the mezzo and macro levels, as it is the means by which management 
operationalizes the constructs of culture of safety. 
Construction safety management. Construction management in its simplest 
terms is a safety profession specifically targeted to address the multi-faceted issues 
reflected in the planning, design, and overall process at the construction work site. Those 
professionals in the field are charged with addressing safety policies and protocols by 
supplying management support and specific knowledge and proficiencies necessary to 
keep the worker and workplace free from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a 
combination of both. While a set of systematic project checks and balances are utilized to 
manage the business side of a construction project, specifically those of cost, scope of 
work, quality of work, and time management, workplace and worker safety are meant to 
be of equal priority and a cohesive component of all safety and health related facets of the 
process. 
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Outline of Dissertation 
This dissertation is separated into six distinct chapters plus appendices. The first 
chapter offers a short overview of the construction industry as highly hazardous and as 
such, requiring further exploration, specifically regarding workplace safety and its 
relationship to climate of safety as seen through the lenses of management’s leadership 
styles and perception of climate of safety at both the macro and micro levels, the research 
methodology, the problem statement, and the research questions.  
Chapter Two provides a historical context regarding labor relations in the United 
States as a means of creating a better understanding of the emergence of construction 
safety and the role of both management and the front-line worker in keeping the jobsite 
free of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both. Chapter Three outlines a 
comprehensive review of established literature on the topic and also highlights notable 
disparities in the breadth and scope of the research. This chapter also advances two 
theoretical frameworks: Marxism and Systems Theory. These theories provide a deeper 
insight into the important role construction management plays, the need for it to be 
looked at in its totality, the socio-political and economic paradigm, and finally the 
systemic construct operating from a top down and bottom communication loop.  
To that end, Marxist ideology as a philosophical, socio-economic, and political 
paradigm is an amalgamation of the ideas of founders Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.  
For the purposes of this research, Marxism allows for an opportunity to explore an 
industry in conflict with itself as it strives to keep the worker safe while still realizing a 
profit. (Elling, 1989). 
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Equally important is that of systems theory, which is also applicable to this 
research. Systems theory is based on the premise that information is to be understood in 
the context of the totality of all the parts and not a process of segmentation (Jackson, 
2001). This is especially relevant today within the construction industry as it looks at 
ways to integrate the whole versus the parts challenge manifested during the last century 
(Meadows, 2008). Chapter Four outlines the research methodology for this study. This 
also includes a thorough explanation of the means and methods by which the researcher 
performed the quantitative study, including how the data was collected and analyzed as 
well as any ethical issues resulting from the research. The analysis was conducted with 
the aid of SPSS to calculate statistical data, including both descriptive and inferential 
statistics. Equally important, it allowed for the analysis of inferential statistics by means 
of the Chi-Square and, where applicable, Cramer’s V. The researcher also explored any 
statistically relevant outcomes based on the demographical information acquired as a 
means of verifying if this information has any bearing on leadership styles and perceived 
climate of safety. 
Chapter Five advances the results from the surveys allowing for an understanding 
of the significance of my hypothesis and also discussed results in detail as they relate to 
the research, with Chapter six offering a broader overview of these outcomes to include 
any proposed limitations as well as offering recommendations for future research and the 
possible impact on construction safety policies. 
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Chapter 2: Context of Labor Movement 
This research endeavored to explore the impact of leadership styles on the 
perceived climate of safety in the construction industry.  Therefore, it was necessary to 
investigate from a historical perspective the interaction of labor and management in 
America. Understanding the past as it relates to the present conflict within the 
construction industry to keep the worker safe underscores that this century-old issue 
continues to impact the industry today. 
The phenomenon of organized labor in the United States is an amalgamation of 
workplace safety, workplace conditions, labor laws, and socio-political paradigms. 
Organized unions, as well as more loosely formed federations and worker groups, have 
historically emerged, evolved, disagreed, and competed for a position in the marketplace 
against the backdrop of an ever-changing society that was constantly looking to balance 
profits versus safety. 
While there exist variations on the theme, the majority of the research on labor’s 
history in the United States, and the ensuing union movement, has included the concept 
of solidarity as a common thread. Dionne (2010) noted that the values of the emerging 
sense of solidarity within the workforce became increasingly alien to the American 
culture. Fraser and Gerstle (1990) echoed these sentiments, recognizing the enigmatic 
nature of labor culture in the Americas. While most industrialized nations had labor 
movements that reflected sponsorship by their own unique and distinct political entities, 
the U.S. remained a noticeable exception. In this country, labor unions acted as the 
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epicenter of what came to be known as the New Deal Coalition, remaining at the 
forefront of national politics from the 1930’s well into the 1960’s (Littler, 1982). 
As early as 1890, scholarly literature regarding organized labor tended to place 
great importance on the emergence of structure within the workforce. By 1960, the social 
sciences had garnished a great deal of interest within academic circles. As such, a 
movement away from organizational structure and towards that of the lived experiences 
of the worker, including that of gender and race, was termed "the new labor history" 
(Brody, 1993, pp. 111-126). 
Organized Labor and the Law 
By the mid-1800’s, the United States labor force was undergoing an immense 
change. Although the Industrial Revolution modernized the workforce, it was not until 
the influx of a large-scale transatlantic migration into the coastal cities created a larger 
population of potential laborers, which in turn allowed controllers of capital to invest in 
labor-intensive enterprises on a larger scale (Montgomery, 1980).  Craft workers found 
that these changes launched them into competition with each other to a degree that they 
had not experienced previously, which limited their opportunities and created a 
substantial risk of downward mobility that had not existed prior to this time (Tomlins, 
2010, p. 112).  
Across the continuum of the first half of the 19
th
 century, there was a shift in 
worker’s rights with a common theme reflected in a newly recognized sensitivity towards 
that of the workforce and whether the workers would be supported in utilizing their 
power collectively to obtain better working conditions, benefits, fair wages, appropriate 
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working hours, and an overall more accommodating workplace (Bowles & Ginitis, 1976). 
This power, impossible to be realized on the individual level, could be obtained utilizing 
the construct of solidarity noted in the literature as collective bargaining power.  
Therefore, prior to the history-changing decision in the case of Commonwealth v. 
Hunt, which effectively legalized the formation of unions, collective bargaining and 
organized labor movements had almost no power based on legal precedent and fear of 
legal repercussions (Nelles, 1932). The Hunt case changed the solidarity movement 
forever. The case made labor collectives legal and enabled the workforce to bind together 
in support of a systemic and cultural shift, specifically by recognizing the role of the 
worker as a part of the decision-making process regarding the work performed and the 
way in which tasks were operationalized.  This was appropriately summarized in a 
statement made by economist Edwin Witte (1926), who indicated that “the doctrine that a 
combination to raise wages is illegal was allowed to die by common consent. No leading 
case was required for its overthrow” (p. 827). While Hunt was not the first case to 
recognize labor collectives and labor unions as legal entities, the case was in fact the first 
to do so with a sense of unrivaled clarity by creating a platform for legal precedent, 
allowing for arguments to be upheld by the courts in support of the creation of labor 
unions (Brody, 1993). 
The Rise of Federations and Labor Unions 
Founded in 1866, The National Labor Union (NLU) is recognized as the first 
national labor federation in the United States. In direct competition with the National 
Labor Union, the more inclusive and forward-thinking Order of Knights of St. Crispin, 
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founded in 1867, documents more than 50,000 members by 1870, making it the largest 
union of its time in the country. This organization was also unique insofar as it 
recognized women in its membership under the auspices of Daughters of St. Crispin, 
which was recognized statistically as comprising 10 percent of the union's total 
membership by 1886 (Kessler, 2003). 
These early efforts by the workforce to find strength in an organizational structure 
were often unsuccessful because of infighting and an inability on the part of coworkers to 
transcend the mindset of tradesmen. They were also unable to move forward to a more 
macro-level thought process, which would be categorized today as upper and middle 
management. While many of the early federations did not realize their organizational 
goals, the Knights of Labor in 1869 became the first representation of effective labor 
organizations to embrace a regional model of membership. The core manifesto focused 
on the unity and best interest of all involved in the production of goods, and the 
organization reflected a unique change in the focus of such groups by realizing not only 
laborers, but anyone who fell under the broader umbrella of producer (Cohen, 1979). 
The Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions was established in 1881 
under the direction of Samuel Gompers.  Like its predecessor, it was a cooperative of 
multiple unions that did not have a membership. Instead, it utilized the power of 
organized strikes to improve worker conditions and the uniformity of wage scales 
(Montgomery, 1980). Whereas this Federation made some strides in realizing favorable 
legislation, the degree of success in organizing and creating new unions was minimal. In 
1886, an already tenuous relationship between the trade union movement and the Knights 
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of Labor became so strained, a convention was called on December 8th of the same year, 
focusing on the realization that their collective power far outweighed their individual 
means.  As such, they formed a new organization known as the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) (Gildemeister, 1981). 
Organized Labor Between 1900 -1920 
Although the standard of living between 1900 and 1920 for the American 
workforce was higher in comparison to Europe during the same period, there was still 
social unrest. Australian historian Peter Shergold (1982) confirmed these findings in a 
study in which he compared wages and standard of living in Pittsburgh with Birmingham, 
England. His findings revealed that: 
After taking into account the cost of living (which was 65% higher in the US.), 
The standard of living of unskilled workers was about the same in the two cities, 
while skilled workers had about twice as high a standard of living. The American 
advantage grew over time from 1890 to 1914, and there was a heavy steady flow 
of skilled workers from Britain to industrial America. Skilled Americans did earn 
higher wages than British, yet unskilled workers did not, while Americans worked 
longer hours with a greater chance of injury and had fewer social services (p. 61). 
Weaknesses of Organized Labor, 1920- 1929 
Despite the fact that the labor movement had made great strides leading up to the 
1920’s, the next decade reflected a noticeable overall decline. The decline resulted in a 
marked decrease in union membership, as well as involvement of union members in 
affiliated activities. It is interesting to note that, although during this period there was 
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economic prosperity, weak leadership within the movement and a growing prominence of 
anti-union beliefs on the part of employers, along with macro-level government entities, 
deeply undermined the union’s ability to remain cohesive. One major decline was the 
number of workers participating in strikes.  In 1919, over 4 million workers representing 
21% of the workforce participated in over 36,000 strikes. By 1929, only 289,000 workers 
representing only 1.2% of the workforce participated in only 900 strikes (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, 1976). 
The 1920’s were also marked by a noticeable absence of strong leadership within 
the labor movement. William Green, the Secretary-Treasurer of the United Mine Workers 
who took on the leadership role of the American Federation of Labor after the death of 
Samuel Gompers, was not well received. As a result, the AFL reflected a sharp decrease 
in membership, having less than 3 million members in 1925 after a peak of 4 million in 
1920 (Wright, 2003). With this decline in the strength of union confederations, individual 
employers across the nation galvanized their forces in a highly successful campaign 
against unions which came to be known as the American Plan. The American Plan 
"sought to depict unions as alien to the nations individualistic spirit" (Sloane & Witney, 
1997, p. 70). 
Despite the aforementioned decline in the labor movement, the Great Depression 
breathed new life into the idea of the collective bargaining power of the worker and the 
ability for an organized workforce to establish a more integral role in both workplace 
conditions and worker safety. 
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Organized Labor, 1929-1955 
With the crash of the stock market in October 1929, the Great Depression 
produced an unprecedented unemployment rate of 25% (Smith, 2006). Understandably, 
there was also a sharp decline in union membership, and in turn, union influence over the 
workplace, as the labor force simply could not afford dues. In the throes of such 
economic despair, one might expect the workforce to take a more radical approach to 
change.  One such option would have been to rise up against what was deemed the 
capitalistic system that was oppressing them. In reality, while some workers did move 
toward a more radical approach (that of the Communist Party), the majority of workers 
did nothing, feeling an overwhelming sense of powerlessness (Smith, 2006). During this 
period, there was a marked increase in Communist and Socialist sentiments, 
organizations that strove to galvanize "unfocused neighborhood militancy into organized 
popular defense organizations" (Zieger, 1994, pp. 11-19). 
With the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, President Herbert Hoover 
supported this pro-union bill. His action sparked a move toward structured policies and 
procedures that protected against unfair court injunctions during the course of labor 
disputes (Cohen, 1979). The Act also recognized the need to protect both middle 
management as well as the front-line worker. More importantly, it signaled a systemic 
change in United States public policy since collective bargaining power of workers was 
in direct contrast to, and sorely undermined by, the court system prior to the Act. 
Essentially, the judiciary did not recognize the importance of protecting the American 
workforce (Sloan & Witney, 1997). When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt took 
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office on March 4, 1933, there was a sense of urgency to address the ramifications of this 
economic crisis and a commitment to change. This new impetus was seen in the creation 
and implementation of the National Industry Recovery Act, which once again 
undermined the importance and judicial support of the workers’ right to organize under 
the auspices of the union (Wright, 2003). Though it did provide for worker safety, better 
working conditions and increased wages, the most important outcomes were the 
revitalization and recognition of both the need and legality to allow workers to leverage 
their collective strength. Specifically, it acknowledged that, “employees shall have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively through representative of their own choosing, 
and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers” (Smith, 2006, 
p.104). 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 was ultimately found unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in 1935 and was replaced by the Wagner Act. This new act played an 
important role in the history of the American workforce, especially at a time when the 
economic future of the country was in question. Furthermore, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
of 1932 supported the concept of power in numbers and of recognizing a responsibility to 
the worker, as well as a worker's right and responsibility to play an active role in 
decisions being considered by the employer, which had a direct impact on workplace 
safety. Specifically, it was the first time the federal government utilized its power and 
over-sight as a means of protecting and adjudicating employer-employee arguments and 
as an integral means of mitigating unlawful behavior against workers (Gildemeister, 
1981). 
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Its core concepts fostered collective bargaining and defended the theory and 
practice of freedom of association. It also defined and prohibited five unfair labor 
practices by employers, including interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees 
against their rights; Interfering with the formation of a labor organization; discriminating 
against employees to encourage or discourage forming a union; discriminating against 
employees who file charges or testify; and refusing to bargain collectively with the 
employees’ representative (Schilling, M. S., M. A. Mulford, et al. 2006) . 
 The AFL was not without its opposition. This was demonstrated in the creation 
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) on November 9, 1939, reflecting 
dissent from eight international unions already belonging to the AFL.  Both the CIO and 
AFL experienced unprecedented expansion in membership during the period of unrest 
among workers during the Great Depression, but did not always agree on how to meet the 
needs of the working class.  
The contention between the two groups was often acrimonious. On September 10, 
1936 in a show of power, the AFL unilaterally revoked all CIO unions, undermining the 
ability of the group to meet the needs of all workers in all industries. The CIO saw great 
change in 1938 when they made the decision to cut ties with the AFL, forming an 
autonomous labor federation aptly named the Congress of Industrial Organizations. This 
choice reflected the CIO’s central ideals regarding an effective and equitable organization 
of the United States labor movement. Additionally, there was an inclusive stance 
regarding the needs of industry-based workers. 
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While the AFL and the CIO were adversaries for close to two decades, with each 
calling for the other to disband and become part of the other, the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947 deeply undermined the CIO, with many leaders seeing the McCarthyism as 
invasive. This legislation can only be understood against the backdrop of the Cold War. 
Taft-Hartley, passed by a Republican Congress over President Truman's veto in 1947, 
harnessed the powerful psychological belief that a Communist influx would lead to a 
destabilization of the United States’ national security as a justification for rolling back 
many of the advantages labor had gained in the 1935 Wagner Act. Most of the bill's 
provisions—banning closed shops, secondary strikes, and the spending of dues for 
political purposes, while allowing states to pass union-busting "right to work" laws—had 
no Cold War purpose. They represented a long-stymied pro-business Republican agenda 
that had suffered under FDR's New Deal administration (Bruns & Schlesinger, 1975).  
These anti-labor provisions caused labor leaders, and even Truman himself, to denounce 
Taft-Hartley as a “slave labor bill” (Holmlund, 2004) that was parlayed by Republicans 
as integral to national defense due to the threat engendered by the Cold War.  
To that end, Taft-Hartley targeted Communists within the labor movement by 
demanding union officials sign affidavits asserting they were not members of the 
Communist Party. Any union that refused to sign lost all rights to a hearing before the 
National Labor Relations Board, retracting any protection under federal law (Leebaert, 
2002). The CIO’s unwillingness to swear that they held no ties to the Communist Party 
weakened the cause and both internal and external pressures forced them on December 4, 
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1955 to rejoin the AFL, forming a restructured body known as the American Federation 
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) (Zieger, 1994). 
World War II had a dramatic impact on union membership: 
There was a marked increase from 8.7 million in 1940, to over 14.3 million in 
1945, representing approximately 36% of the overall workforce. While this 
reincarnation of unions was of importance, of equal interest was the emergence of 
women factory workers. Both the AFL and CIO supported Roosevelt in 1940 and 
1944 with an overwhelming 75 percent or more of their support reflected in votes, 
millions of dollars of support, and tens of thousands of workers (Lichtenstein, 
1982, pp. 301-307). 
These improvements were due in part to the fact that those spearheading the labor 
movement did not come from traditional families of privilege, and instead, mirrored the 
lives of the general population (Lich & Barron, 1978). With the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, closed shops became illegal. This historical event is especially 
pertinent to this research, as it reflects recognition of the importance of contractual 
agreements within the arena of labor related issues. With an acknowledgment of the 
importance of unions, as well as an understanding of the need for nonunion entities, the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 allowed for the emergence of a labor force that would recognize 
the socio-political importance of working within a set of guidelines. These guidelines 
would not only potentially enhance the fiscal well-being of the employer, but also protect 
the worker and allow for economic advancement of the labor force collectively at both 
the macro and micro-levels  
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Recent History, Post 1960 
After the 1960s, the United States experienced an expansion in the public sector, 
specifically in the area of labor unions. This rapid growth was due in part to secured 
wages and highly sought-after pensions for members. It was also marked by a decline in 
manufacturing and farming, manifesting in a spike of local government employment. 
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2010), "local government employment 
quadrupled from 4 million workers in 1950 to 12 million in 1976 and 16.6 million in 
2009" (n.p.). Yet from 2011 to the present, as a result of increased fiscal instability, the 
public sector, and more specifically unions, again came under heavy scrutiny as both the 
state and federal government tried to reduce the power and impact of unions to 
collectively bargain (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012). 
The history of the labor market, worker conditions, unions, federations, and 
related institutions in the United States is well documented. As such, navigating the 
complexities of real world economics was inherently more multifarious than that of 
purely theory-based or academic modalities. Instead of simply exploring the often socio-
economic and perceived needs of macro level market systems, the real-time progression 
and shifts of the United States labor force was manifested through an intricate and 
interrelated web driven by the decisions, actions, and at times self-serving needs of 
market members.  
Subsequently, history has shown that the impact on the labor market does not 
always respond immediately and as accurately as theorized due to fluctuating paradigms. 
These paradigms are based on an equally fluid set of motivators. Propelled by a multitude 
34 
 
of psycho-social forces driven by an employer’s desire for increased returns, history has 
shown that the best interest of the worker is not always a priority. 
The history of labor markets in the United States reflects a systemic reality that 
supports the influence of market processes and of the distribution of both tangible and 
intangible resources on workplace safety (Norton, 2001). Often tumultuous, the United 
States’ labor markets have shown both an ability and resiliency in response to ever 
emerging relationships between that of supply and demand. To that end, the labor 
movement has achieved great strides in recognizing the cyclical nature of the workforce  
as related to changes in settlement patterns within the United States (Kersten, 2006). In 
turn, the navigation of precarious organizational and structural fluctuations as a result of 
the frenetic pace imposed by technology, has led to issues impacting management ability 
and commitment to worker safety. 
Worker Compensation 
It would be impossible to explore the connection between the history of 
workplace safety and the ultimate creation of OSHA without also briefly discussing the 
impact of worker’s compensation. With the rise of a recognition that workers have a right 
to a safe job site, the concept for compensating those workers who were in fact injured 
quickly became part of discussions regarding a need to create policies and procedures as 
part of the overall structure for protecting the worker. Based on European best practices 
within the safety arena, several states in the U.S. made an effort to recognize a 
compensation system. While on the surface this might appear as yet another successful 
step towards a cohesive safety management plan of action, organized labor was not 
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swayed and demonstrated great opposition, claiming that attention to this issue focused 
on reactive rather than proactive or preventative interventions. Although these ideas did 
not garner the support that was initially hoped for, "insurance company safety experts 
helped improve their client safety programs and the establishment of compensation gave 
the safety movement a moral boost" (Lubove, 1967, pp. 278-279). 
Early Federal Action 
During the infancy of workplace safety and the creation of OSHA, the federal 
government kept a relatively low profile. It was, however, not completely silent on issues 
regarding safety and health. This lack of involvement did slow the movement by 
undermining the real and implied importance and legitimacy of claims that worker safety 
needed to be a priority from the top down, and as such, to be recognized in macro-level 
initiatives. Of interest was the role of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, who quietly 
and almost invisibly began to investigate and publish detailed studies of death and 
disease, in what were deemed “dusty trades”, along with other health related topics. In 
1910, the Bureau published a study by a labor law advocate, John B. Andrews, on the 
horrors of phosphorus necrosis (“phossy jaw”), a “disfiguring and sometimes fatal 
disease of the jawbone suffered by workers in the white phosphorous match industry” 
(Doehring, 1903, p 44). 
In 1913, the Federal Government took a more active role in labor relations when 
Congress created the Department of Labor. One of its prime directives was the 
improvement of working conditions. A Senate directive specifically “called on the newly 
appointed Secretary of Labor, William B Wilson, to report on industrial diseases and 
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accidents” (Congressional Record Vol. 51, p. 11395, as cited in MacLaury, 1981). At 
Wilson's direction, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (formerly the US Bureau of Labor) 
began the arduous process of collecting accident statistics on a regular basis, beginning 
with iron and steel industries. This led to a gradual inclusion of what were deemed to be 
some of the more hazardous workplaces, including other areas such as construction. 
Wilson was unwavering in his efforts and was said to be driven by a mantra that 
included, "into the maw of unhealthy occupations… the thing to do is to make the 
unhealthy occupations healthy" (Wilson, 1914, n.p.) 
With the need to balance the impact of World War I on the economy of the United 
States, as well as continue the momentum on the health and safety forefront, Congress 
created the Working Conditions Service. The service inspected war production sites, 
advising companies how to reduce hazards, and helped states develop and enforce safety 
and health standards. When the war ended, the Service was allowed to expire, but the 
Labor Department ordered its records “saved for the time when public and legislative 
opinion again shall have become focused upon the necessity for constructive organization 
of this character” (U.S. Department of Labor, 1919, n.p.).  
OSHA: A Brief History 
The construction industry can be seen as an industry in conflict with itself as a 
result of the actions, or lack thereof, between those dictating safety policies and 
protocols, that of management and those impacted directly by them, and that of the 
frontline worker. This was explored utilizing Marxist Theory and Systems Theory in the 
context of Construction Safety Management to better understand the impact on the means 
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and methods that have been utilized to meet minimum OSHA standards. OSHA is an 
important construct in both theory and practice, as it is a large governmental agency and 
part of a larger socio-political schema with a history of being understaffed and slow to 
make changes. As such, it has not been in a position to keep the construction worker as 
safe as originally hoped across the continuum of this multi-faceted industry. 
December 29, 1970, marked an important turning point in workplace safety as it 
was the day that President Richard Nixon signed the Williams-Steiger Occupational 
Safety and Health Act into law. The Act gave the Federal Government the right and 
authority to oversee and enforce safety and health standards for most of the country's 
workers. The Act came out of a long and arduous legislative tug-of-war beginning in 
1968 when President Lyndon Johnson endeavored to realize similar outcomes. Much like 
the maturation of labor relations and the labor workforce, regulating workplace hazards 
reflects a tumultuous history dating back to the late 19th century (MacLaury, 1981). 
In 1870, the Massachusetts Bureau of statistics of labor highlighted the need for 
legislation that would recognize, address, and have the means to correct unsafe acts, 
unsafe conditions, or a combination of both in the workplace; specifically, those related 
to poor ventilation. In 1877, "Massachusetts passed the nation’s first factory inspection 
law. It required guarding of belts, shafts, and gears, protection on elevators, and adequate 
fire exits" (Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1872, n.p.). This recognition of 
worker safety prompted many other states to recognize worker safety issues and put forth 
actions and legislation. While well intentioned, it was haphazard at best, and by 1899 
some, but not all, states had established and adopted the need for factory inspections; 13 
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mandated machine guarding, and 21 states recognized to differing degrees the need to 
take into account health hazards impacting both the worksite and the individual worker. 
OSHA and Labor Standards 
The appointment of Frances Perkins in 1933 as Secretary of Labor marked a 
continued commitment by President Roosevelt to include the highest level of government 
in workplace safety and health policies and protocol.  As part of Roosevelt's New Deal, 
the Federal Government took on a greater role in protecting people at the jobsite. Most 
specifically, the Social Security Act of 1935 made it possible for the U.S. Public Health 
and Service Department to fund programs related to worker and industrial health by 
allocating resources to state health departments. This remains relevant today, 
underscoring that for workers to be protected, a collaboration between the Federal, State, 
and local administrations must exist.  
By 1960, this collaboration was recognized by the creation of Federal 
Occupational Safety and Health requirements that were applicable across state lines, as 
well as to a wide range of hazardous industries (U.S. Department of Labor, 1960). While 
innovative, these new initiatives and regulations did not garner overwhelming popularity. 
General industry felt that because there had been no public access to hearings, employers 
in the labor industry as a whole had been ignored. In response, the federal government 
convened and, upon reflection of the public outcry, formally announced and recognized 
these issues. In October 1963, revisions were offered, in addition to public hearings in 
March 1964 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1964). 
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Early in 1969, the acknowledgment for the need of a more general approach to 
job safety and health was also addressed at the highest levels of government. In 1965, 
Congress enacted various laws in an effort to manifest further protection of workers. 
These laws included the Service Contract Act of 1965 and the Federal Construction 
Safety and Health Act of 1969. Both Acts offered the opportunity to fill the gaps to 
further protect the worker; yet, it wasn't until the Nixon Administration that the power of 
federal action was fully realized when the President presented his concept of a 
comprehensive job safety and health program to Congress in August 1969 (Wright, 
2003).  
The Nixon Administration proposal offered a five-person board that would set 
and enforce job safety and health standards. The Labor Department would be limited in 
inspecting workplaces. Nixon emphasized the use of existing efforts by private industry 
and state governments. The main federal concern would be with the health research and 
education and training, and only secondary with direct regulation (MacLaury, 1981). 
Opposition by Labor 
Nixon's movement towards greater levels of regulation regarding workplace 
health and safety were not supported by organized labor. In fact, unions were driven by a 
strong belief that specific actions must be created to deal with workplace hazards. They 
did not believe that this could be done under the Nixon proposal, and voiced strong 
concerns regarding dangers related to the handling of chemicals. There were mixed 
opinions. Yet out of these discussions and robust debates came comments and 
commentary by Irving Selikoff (1970), who reflected on the suffering of construction 
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workers who were disproportionately impacted by fatal injuries during the application of 
asbestos insulation to buildings. In an effort to invigorate conversation rather than 
conflict, and refusing to point a finger at any one group, he posed the question, “who 
killed Cock Robin? No one… His has been an impersonal, technological death… We 
have all failed” (as cited in MacLaury, 1981). 
Despite disagreements, President Nixon was finally able to sign the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, creating OSHA and demonstrating the tangible 
benchmark of an historical movement that first found its voice in the factories of 
Massachusetts in the late 1800’s. 
Period Between 1970-2017 
The early 1970s reflected a new sense of competition within heavily unionized 
industries. Due in part to deregulation in communications and transportation, as well as a 
paradigm shift leading to industrial restructuring, America was forced to face a new 
reality, one in which foreign goods were taking over the marketplace (Elling, 1989). 
As the oligopolistic and highly regulated market structures began to fall apart, the 
non-union workforce became an economic necessity in some markets (Leebaert, 2002). 
Concession bargaining became a reality, forcing the once nearly un-wielding trade unions 
to offer allowances by surrendering unionized pay scales and worker conditions. This 
capitulation was seen as a necessary response to the Recession as a form of job security 
(Dionne, 2010). 
Moreover, with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the rise to power of an 
anti-union administration changed the course of union and non-union relations forever:  
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Between 1975 and 1985, union membership fell by 5 million. In manufacturing, 
the unionized portion of the labor force dropped below 25 percent, while mining 
and construction, once labor’s flagship industries, were decimated. By the end of 
the 1980s, less than 17 percent of American workers were organized, half the 
proportion of the early 1950’s (Rosenbloom, 1998, pp. 287-288). 
To that end, the Age of Reagan saw a continued collective bargaining retreat as wage-
earning Americans were faced with declining living standards not experienced since the 
Great Depression, leaving the union movement a weakened economic and political 
influence on all fronts (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012). 
From the end of the Reagan Era to the present, OSHA has been a major force in 
shaping and reshaping the labor force (Bartel & Thomas, 1985).   With a focus on 
emergency response, President Clinton signed the Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act 
of 2000, directing OSHA to amend its Bloodborne Pathogens (BBP) standard and codify 
industry compliance. To fully implement the new law, OSHA published updates to the 
Bloodborne Pathogens standard on January 18, 2001 in the Federal Register. The 
revisions went into effect on April 18, 2001 and focused on the obligations of employers, 
including additions to the exposure control and better record keeping regarding injury 
rates (Bunn, Pikelny, Slavin, & Paralkar, 2001). 
After the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, OSHA took on a pivotal role 
in safeguarding the safety and health of responders at the World Trade Center site.  These 
attacks created a job site never experienced by the United States. Rescue workers, with 
the task of the search and recovery of both survivors and the deceased, faced an 
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extraordinary number of hazards.  During the extensive demolition and cleanup, “OSHA, 
the City of New York, labor unions, contractors, and other government agencies 
collaborated to ensure that no other injuries or fatalities occurred during the dangerous 
recovery operations” (Choudhry and Mohamed, 2007), p. 26). 
On March 23, 2005, the BP Texas City refinery was the site of one of the worst 
industrial disasters in recent U.S. history. The resulting explosion and fire killed 15 
people and injured 180. The incident alarmed the community and resulted in financial 
losses exceeding $1.5 billion (OSHA, 2012). After the incident, “OSHA conducted an 
investigation and issued 301 egregious willful violations for which BP paid a $21 million 
penalty” (OSHA, 2012).  
An explosion in February 2008 left 14 employees dead with 39 others severely 
injured at the Imperial Sugar Refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia. This catastrophic 
incident engendered the third largest fine in the history of OSHA – $8.7 million – for 
safety violations identified at the company’s facilities in Port Wentworth, Georgia and 
Gramercy, Louisiana (OSHA, 2009).  
From 2008 to 2017, OSHA’s efforts address worker safety, but as is shown since 
the Reagan Era, these efforts are largely from a reactive approach (Caldwell & Mays, 
2012).   More specifically, OSHA has addressed worker safety and has lobbied for 
various Acts to protect the worker, but these come after catastrophic events and a 
tremendous loss of human capital that no fines or penalties can ever recover (Leebaert, 
2002). 
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Conclusion 
The legacy of labor relations in America is complex. Organized labor played a 
significant role in shaping our society.  At times, unions have obstructed the socio-
economic growth of the nation, and, at other times, have supported industrious 
collaborations with management allowing for profitable innovation and the protection of 
human capital. With a history mirroring larger systemic challenges, including racism, 
sexism, and ageism, the labor movement is responsible for assisting immigrants, blacks, 
and women to gain access to the American Dream.  
While seen as an impediment toward economic progress by some small 
businesses as a result of insistence upon rigid adherence to costly work-related 
guidelines, the war on wages has created better pay and benefits enabling millions of 
workers to join the middle class. As a result, the history of this labor movement in 
America is as diverse as those it continues to represent. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This section explores the present literature regarding the topic of safety across the 
continuum of the construction industry and its impact at the macro, mezzo, and micro 
levels. The importance of more effective means and methods related to construction 
safety management is not in question.  Proactive approaches aimed at moving the 
industry forward in keeping the front-line worker safe have stagnated, and as such, 
construction safety management and job site safety have become a cruel oxymoron.  By 
exploring a variety of sources on the topic, the impact of leadership styles on climate of 
safety were reviewed, while simultaneously highlighting key concepts including those of 
culture, safety, and climate of safety. Of further importance was an examination of what 
present literature deems as a disconnect between an extensive expanse of quantitative 
research on the topic, yet also a lack of reliable scales and measures that can be applied to 
all areas of the industry; an industry that employs many unique trades, but still must 
remain focused on means and methods that offer proactive solutions to ensure the worker 
is protected from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both. 
Of equal importance was the analysis of theoretical constructs, specifically those 
of Marxism and systems theory, to help better understand why accidents occur, and how 
to address the crossroads between utilizing theory to invigorate innovative and scalable 
safety practices. Nearly 6.5 million people work at approximately 252,000 construction 
sites across the United States on any given day (Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration, 2005). The fatal injury rate from workplace accidents for the 
construction industry is higher than the national average for all industries (OSHA, 2015). 
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Construction is a Hazardous Industry 
Construction is a hazardous industry. Even if workplace injuries are not fatal, the 
results can be catastrophic, leaving the worker a paraplegic, quadriplegic, or manifesting 
various other physiological, cognitive, and psychological challenges. OSHA has 
identified Construction’s Fatal Four, the leading causes of worker deaths on construction 
sites: falls, electrocution, struck by objects and caught-in-between (2015). The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), in their Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 2012, “Fatal 
Occupational Injuries By Industry and Event or Exposure” (OSHA, 2012), demonstrated 
that  approximately 17 percent, were construction workers, the largest number of fatal 
workplace injuries nationally. In terms of the Fatal Work Injury Rate per 100,000 full-
time equivalent workers, the national construction industry was 9.9, or almost three times 
that of the national all-worker injury rate of 3.4. (BLS, 2012). 
Nationwide, as a result of the 2008 Recession having a strong impact on the 
construction industry, the years between 2007 and 2010 saw a steady and substantial 
decline in construction nonfatal lost time injuries, a decline of approximately 45%. With 
the Recession coming to a close beginning in 2010 and the construction industry 
beginning to rebound, the trend of declining lost time injuries halted between 2010-2012 
with a slight increase of less than one-half of one percent (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. U.S. Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses. 
Nationwide, between 2007-2009, the construction industry experienced a major, 
substantial increase of nonfatal lost time injuries. However, from that year forward, the 
industry experienced substantial shifts in the number of these injuries. Between 2009 and 
2010, a decrease of approximately 140% occurred; and between 2010 and 2012, no such 
similar accidents are reported to have taken place.  This appears to be either a coding 
error or, more probably, the result of the height from which accidents occurred. 
Commercial buildings, warehouses, supermarkets, and box stores commonly have a roof 
to interior floor height of 24 feet. 
A graphic representation of this trend in construction nonfatal nationwide lost 
time jobsite injuries involving fall through roof/fall through surface of existing opening, 
26-30 feet, is shown below. 
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Figure 2. U.S. Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Construction. 
To that end, although safety has been the focus of the industry, acknowledgement 
of the problem is not enough (Gillen, et. al., 2002). Instead, macro and mezzo level 
entities, specifically general contractors, sub-contractors, and safety supervisors must 
offer a tangible means of operationalizing policy and protocol at the executive level, so 
that it may be put into day-to-day practice regarding safety management (OSHA, 2015). 
The concept of work or safety climate, and how workers perceive the safety 
climate of their workplace, was raised as an issue more than 20 years ago by Zohar 
(1980). At the time, it was recognized that successful injury control programs are based 
on strong management commitment to safety, including the status of safety officers 
within the organization, worker training, regular communication between management 
and workers, general housekeeping, and a stable workforce (Guo, Yiu, & Gonzalez, 
2015). In his findings, Zohar (1980) discovered that factories reporting sustainable and 
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successful safety programs were marked by a clear commitment on the part of 
management to make safety protocol and practices a priority.  This commitment was 
manifested in numerous ways. 
Specifically, in companies realizing consistently low-accident rates, macro level 
management was repeatedly shown to take personal ownership in the creation, 
implementation and sustainability of safety policies and procedures at regular and often 
predetermined intervals, while the same level of commitment was noticeably lacking in 
companies with higher accident rate. 
Safety climate, considered a subset of overall organizational climate, was one way 
of identifying characteristics that might distinguish between employers with high or low 
injury rates  (Coyle, Sleeman & Adams, 1995; Zohar, 1980). Prioritizing safety is not a 
new concept for the construction industry, as it is accepted that workplace safety 
programs, when conceptualized and implemented properly, improve workplace safety.  
Hakkinen (1995) echoed this belief in her research on management’s role in training, for 
example. This is further seen in the work of Chen and Jin (2012), where they showed the 
importance of the interplay between management and workers to address job site safety, 
finding that “such programs could also potentially enhance an organization’s safety 
culture or climate” (pp. 805-817). This concept finds further support with Smith, Foklard, 
Tucker, and Macdonald (1998), who stated support for the belief that “the basis for 
acceptable safety performance is an established and robust safety management system 
that provides the means for controlling and monitoring performance safety”  (p. 217).  
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Nearly two decades old, Climate of Safety still remains relevant to worker safety 
(Shapira & Lyachin, 2009). When first introduced into mainstream construction safety 
management, it was understood that successful injury control needed to be rooted in 
making safety a priority.  This can only be accomplished when workplace safety, safety 
management, and safety climate are measured. Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) 
specifically focused on finding ways in which to measure safety climate; they found that 
by converging on worker safety, incident rates could be decreased if the goal of the 
policies and procedures were specifically aimed at the micro/worker level. Gillen, 
Faucett, Beaumont, and McLoughlin (1997) showed interest in the construction industry 
by taking a focused look at nonfatal falls and their correlation to safety management 
issues. Matilla, Rantanen, and Hytinnen (1994) and Brown and Holmes (1986) also 
explored the effectiveness of safety climate scales with their focus on the manufacturing 
industry in United States. Diaz and Cabrera (1997) saw a similar need for those in 
construction to understand Climate of Safety as it related to overall worker safety in the 
area of large-scale highway construction.  
Further evidence of the importance of continuing to carry out this kind of research 
is reflected in the work of Hinze, Hallowell, and Baud (2013), who all agreed that 
“accidents and injuries still occur repeatedly on sites and it appears construction safety 
has hit a plateau” (p 139). A new way of approaching safety management was emerging, 
one that addressed the multi-faceted aspects of the construction job site as the complexity 
of accident causation. Although accident statistics were widely used throughout the 
construction industry, Laitinen, Marjamäki, and Keijo (1993) state that it is almost 
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impossible to use accidents as a safety indicator for a single building construction site: 
“This is because of random variation where many sites will have no accidents, and it is 
not possible to determine whether these sites with zero accidents were safer than sites 
with accidents ” (pp. 463-464).  
To that end, Glendon and McKenna (1995) identified a number of reasons why 
accident data, or similar outcome data, were poor measures of safety performance. The 
main problems were that such data were insufficiently sensitive, of dubious accuracy, 
retrospective, and ignored risk exposure. Therefore, it makes sense that, as a result of the 
complexity of construction safety management and the inclusion of multiple trades and 
multi-organizational collaboration in the construction industry, barriers still exist 
systemically that impede the creation of an effective means of understanding the impact 
of management styles at the macro and micro levels (Lunt, Bates, Bennett, and 
Hopkinson, 2008). 
Given the complexity of safety related issues in the construction industry and the 
multitude of moving parts and stakeholders associated with any single project, 
researchers such as Mitropoulos (2002), Abdelhamid, and Howell (2005) have suggested 
that a systems approach is an effective and efficient course of action when addressing 
improvements to the management of safety within the construction industry.  
Consequently, since the construction industry is set apart from most other 
industries in respect to site-specific safety, research and interventions make it necessary 
to examine it as such. There must also be sensitivity to issues of leadership styles at the 
macro-level (culture of safety), and the impact at the mezzo and micro level(s) (climate 
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of safety) as a means of engendering a greater priority in all safety related construction 
research and interventions of keeping the worker safe (Rowlinson, 2004). 
The Impact of Leadership Styles on Climate of Safety 
This review of pertinent literature and the ensuing research specifically seeks to 
examine the impact that management’s leadership styles has on climate of safety at the 
construction job site, paying close attention to the need to focus on the macro-level 
systems and the impact they have on micro-level outcomes. Macro-level systems research 
models have played a role in the creation and implementation of constructs of accident 
prevention for more than two decades, with one of the most widely accepted being that of 
the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) developed by Reason (1997). 
The Swiss Cheese Model (SCM), initially developed by James T. Reason in 1997, 
still offers great insight into accident prevention and causation at the macro-level and 
highlights the relationship and interaction between organizational policy at the highest 
level, that of the construction industry as a whole and the ultimate safety of the front-line 
worker.  
As recently as 2013, research continues to be built upon the foundation of the 
Swiss Cheese Model. Therefore, any discussion regarding safety measures and culture 
and climate of safety cannot simply be based on retrospective data or lagging indicators 
such as fatalities, lost time accident rates and incidents. Instead, research transcends these 
paradigms and looks at more functional strategies that can be operationalized to assess 
the degree to which organizations have the ability to properly evaluate day-to-day basis 
safety means and methods. The Swiss Cheese Model does just that and works 
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collaboratively to protect the health and well-being of the construction worker.  Reason 
(1997) offered a theory of accident causation as follows: 
 Accidents involving complex systems were often the result of the grouping of 
multiple contributing factors. 
 Contributing factors can occur in a wide range of domains from unsafe acts 
including organizational errors such as a lack of Culture of Safety. 
 As opposed to the active errors that occur at the time of an incident, many 
contributing factors were in fact latent errors. These latent errors lie dormant, 
waiting for an active effort to turn them into a trigger for an incident. 
 Human beings, lacking unlimited concentration, focus, and memory will always 
be at risk as a result of operational errors; therefore, properly designed systems 
must account for this limitation and be specifically designed to ultimately keep 
these errors from resulting in an actual incident/accident. 
Understanding that scientific research needs to be applicable, Reason (1997) took 
the next step in his integrated accident causation approach, creating a highly effective 
infographic/visual that has come to be known and widely accepted as The Swiss Cheese 
Model.  
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Figure 3. The Swiss Cheese Model Of Accident Causation 
The figure above depicts accident causation against the backdrop of culture and 
climate of safety, allowing for a deeper understanding and greater perspective on the root 
cause of an accident. Rather than simply placing blame or pointing fingers, the Swiss 
Cheese Model offers user-friendly, as well as immediately visible, possibilities for not 
only why the accident occurred at the micro level, climate of safety, but more 
importantly, how the accident was allowed to occur at the macro level, culture of safety. 
Instead of focusing simply on the worker, the Swiss Cheese Model demands 
management peel back the layers of accident causation, letting go of the historical 
tendency to blame the worker, using words such as “careless”, “reckless” and “stupid”; 
all of which were misleading as they cannot be measured and therefore have no place in 
either a proactive or reactive investigation/exploration of any accident. The Swiss Cheese 
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Model allows management the opportunity to preempt accidents, by proactively 
exploring any and all organizational influences that may slip through the holes that we 
have come to attribute literally to Swiss Cheese. 
What makes this model and its contribution to construction safety so profound is 
the understanding that an accident is highly unlikely, if not impossible, to occur without a 
series of previous systemic failures, culture of safety. These failures may not be initially 
obvious, but they do exist. They are often dormant, and as such, demand a commitment 
on the part of management to sustain a level of vigilance that will allow the unseen, yet 
hazardous, components of a weak culture of safety to be highlighted and in turn, 
addressed and corrected long before an accident need occur. 
This model acted as a foundation for further analysis and the development of 
other models, including the Human Factors Analysis Classification Model (HFACS) 
(Reason, 1997). Building on the foundation of accident causation, as seen in the Swiss 
Cheese Model where accidents were understood as no single safety act or omission, Drs. 
Shappell  and Wiegmann (2000) furthered the work of Reason (1997) with the creation of 
the HFACS construct. While HFACS uses many of the same explanations for systemic 
failure and accident causation introduced by Reason, most notably those of organizational 
influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, it 
does not stop there. This model also realizes that information can be further categorized.  
This process allows for specific data to be extrapolated at each level by the inclusion of a 
means of identifying both overt and covert failures that exist. 
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 To that end, systemic disconnect and ensuing failure will be realized at least once 
at each distinct level compromising the entire system and leading to an unfavorable 
event. Subsequently, during this process of system failure, if any one of these factors is 
corrected, the adverse event will be prevented. In its simplest terms, the HFACS 
contextual structure has the ability to offer safety professionals and researchers a reliable 
and replicable way to scientifically identify weak links in an organization’s system of 
safety policies and protocols that engendered a specific accident. Blame becomes 
unimportant, as the focus of HFACS is not on individual fault, rather it is a measurement 
instrument to better recognize those fundamental causal factors that were supported 
systemically to allow for an accident to occur. (See Figure 4 below). 
 
Figure 4. HFACS Model of Organizational Influences 
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The real power in this model is its ability to synthesize historical accident and 
safety data, and structure it against the backdrop of a scientific methodology. This is 
important, as it allows for a comparison between seemingly unrelated accidents in an 
effort to denote important trends in systemic failure. These trends were not only 
applicable across the continuum of a single industry, but within the arena of safety 
management as a whole. At the industry level, the application is no less powerful, as 
conjoint trends with an organization act as important markers that highlight where the 
highest levels of interventions were necessary to avoid system failure and in turn 
accidents. This approach is highly proactive as it looks to the past as a means of 
understanding the present, with the ability to better predict the potential for accidents and 
take measures to decrease accident injury rates. 
In utilizing the HFACS framework, organizations have a scientific method by 
which to recognize interruptions within a system in its entirety, rather than a single 
component of the system. This global perspective of accident prevention targets weak 
areas with laser focus, and offers data-driven solution-focused options with the sole 
purpose of avoiding blame and instead keeping the worker safe (Shappell & Wiegman, 
2000; Celik & Cebi, 2009; Olsen & Shorrock, 2010).  Therefore, the emphasis on 
accident prevention and causation at the macro-level highlights the relationship and 
interaction between organizational policy and the ultimate safety of the front-line worker. 
In short, the focus of this research moves away from the individual worker and 
the specific accident, and instead looks at the event systemically. This type of research 
has emerged and appropriately deviates from a traditional and fixed explanation of 
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accidents. It instead accepts the complexity and multi-layered reality that the system is 
constantly in a state of fluctuation, and as such, research and intervention must continue 
to address this dynamic state accordingly. Le Coze (2013) and Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, 
and Bryden (2000) further echoed the need for exploration and implementation of an 
effective leadership style as a means of creating a strong culture of safety, stating that  
In recent years there has been a movement away from safety measures purely 
based on retrospective data or lagging indicators such as fatalities, lost time 
accident rates and incidents, toward so called leading indicators such as safety 
audits or measurements of as safety climate (p. 177). 
Understanding the Key Concepts 
In an effort to further understand the scope of the research, this review also 
endeavored to explain the key concepts that were most relevant to culture and climate of 
safety. Cooper (2000) makes a compelling argument that defining what he refers to as the 
product of safety culture allows for safety culture to take on both a form and function in 
both an entire industry, as well as individual organizations/companies. Specifically, he 
notes that, “this also could help to determine the functional strategies required to 
developing this product, and it could provide an outcome measure to assess the degree to 
which organizations might or might not possess a ‘good’ safety culture” (Cooper, 2000, 
p. 115).  
The reason for this literature review and ensuing research is due to the fact that 
exploring safety in this manner has been absent from the construction industry. Dester 
and Blockley (1995) agree, admitting that the construction industry is best described as 
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one with a neglected safety culture and climate, not one that is seen as a powerful 
organizational systemic module with the ability to resolve conflict and disagreement; nor 
can it act as an agent of change with the goal of focusing on efforts to improve the reality 
that new safety measures cannot be fully realized until the safety culture is improved. To 
that end, a culture of safety is best understood as consisting of shared beliefs, practices 
and attitudes that exist at a workplace. Therefore, a culture of safety is the construct that 
ultimately shapes management and employee behaviors (Parboteeah, & Kapp, 2008). 
In contrast, a climate of safety consists of “shared employee perceptions of how 
safety management is operationalized” (Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk & Smith-Crowne, 2002, p. 
429). While a subpart of culture of safety, climate of safety is no less integral to the 
creation, implementation, and ongoing sustainability of an effective and efficient culture 
of safety. Together, both culture of safety and climate of safety can engender a safe(r) 
construction workplace. But where ambiguity exists between macro and mezzo level 
forces (management), worker safety is at risk, leading to unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions or a combination of both. 
The Multi-Employer Worksite 
Another important concept is that of the multi-employer construction worksite. 
This is defined as any job site consisting of more than one employer and as such, the 
Prime Contractor, General Contractor or any other employer or a mixture thereof can be 
cited for a hazardous condition that violates an OSHA standard.  
General contractors can be held liable for OSH Act violations even if they did not 
create or expose their own employees to the hazard, relying on 29 C.F.R. 
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§1910.12(a), which provides that ‘each employer shall protect the employment of 
each of his employees engaged in construction work by complying with the 
appropriated standards’ (Fonte & Griffin, 2012).  
The multi-employer worksite holds unique challenges as the culture and climate of safety 
are driven not only by the prime contract, but subcontracts as well. 
Contracts and subcontracts can predict and impact safety when they include a 
stipulation for review and approval of a mandatory construction management safety plan 
included in the contract (Hinze, Hallowell, & Baud, 2013). Both a review of the literature 
and a review of statistics published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics for a period of one decade shows that contracts and subcontracts have not 
historically been used to measure safety (Guo, Yiu, & González, 2015). As such, this 
research explores any statistically relevant relationship between catastrophic and severe 
injuries based on leadership styles, with sensitivity to the role of contract/subcontract 
compliance (Demirkesen & Arditi, 2015). 
The Need for a Proactive Approach to Safety 
The construction industry is in transition and there is still far less research looking 
to evaluate the impact of proactive, rather than reactive, measures regarding safety 
management on the construction work site. Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, and Bryden (2000) 
offers insight, recognizing that “recent academic interest in the measurement of safety 
climate, has resulted in a proliferation of assessment instruments typically in the form of 
self-report questionnaires administered as large-scale surveys…in manufacturing and 
construction” (p. 179). Yet, they also recognize that these measures were not without 
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limitations, as they were usually created by a specific entity and as such, research validity 
varies greatly due to inconsistencies in content, sample size, statistical analysis, and 
methodologies. These were all reasons for more unified measurement scales that were 
focused on measuring indicators such as management style and perceived climate of 
safety of both key decision makers, as well the frontline worker as a means of 
engendering a more unified analysis. To this end, Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) 
analyzed ten safety climate instruments and concluded that only two variables, that of 
management commitment and worker involvement, had been adequately and reliably 
replicated across similar research. Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams (1995) also found a high 
level of variance in several studies all using the same Safety Climate Scale and concluded 
that, “the likelihood of establishing a universal and stable set of safety climate factors 
was highly doubtful” (p. 253). 
The Need for More Quantitative Research 
One of the most pressing questions in the study of construction safety is related to 
the true impact of the qualitative exploration of safety climate and culture within a 
company, as well as the degree to which this kind of research can exclusively be 
considered a reliable gauge of safety performance in construction. This question was 
brought to the forefront by Wamuziri (2007), who believed that there was a need for 
research to evaluate whether it was scientifically relevant to the construction sector. 
Concurrently, Guldenmund (2007) engaged in an extensive meta-analysis of 
qualitative research, concluding that there were a large number of qualitative factors 
(dimensions, scales, and facets) that comprise the culture and climate of safety expressed 
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in weak correlations. This is in agreement with Clarke (2013), who concluded, after his 
own meta-analytic review, that it is unlikely that a strong relationship can be fully 
explored, relying exclusively on qualitative measures. 
Choudhry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007) suggest that although development of a 
positive safety culture can be an effective tool for improving safety, measurement of 
safety performance remains problematic. In turn, they advocate for a multi-faceted 
paradigm involving proactive approaches such as hazard identification and observation, 
rooted in a quantifiable percentage of safety policies, protocols, and behaviors. 
Hence, there exists a significant need in the absence of reliable research to 
effectively explore and assess construction safety quantitatively and more specifically. 
Also important is to explore is the impact of management’s leadership style on climate of 
safety in an effort to not only understand, but to produce tangible and proactive solutions. 
These solutions will decrease both fatal and nonfatal catastrophic injuries in the industry 
(Shapira & Lyachin, 2009; Hapira & Simcha, 2009). 
William Thomson, best known as Lord Kelvin, recognized as early as the mid- 
Nineteenth Century the importance of quantitative research, stating that “if you cannot 
measure it, you cannot improve it” (Cervo, Allen, & Dyché, 2011. p. 127). Later, 
Hammer (1989) hypothesized that one of the greatest obstacles facing the execution of 
safety management was the intrinsic challenge of the reliability of measuring it. Kartam 
and Bouz (1998) voiced the same concern, focusing on the reality that if you cannot 
measure safety, then you certainly cannot manage it. To that end, the researcher 
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endeavored to utilize quantitative data, offering the construction industry a reliable means 
by which to measure and improve culture and climate of safety. 
The Application of Theory to Construction Safety 
Applicable theoretical frameworks were explored to further support and gain 
insight into the challenges facing workplace safety. These included Marxism and Systems 
Theory, recognizing that worker health and safety have remained linked to both 
economic benchmarks as well as construction safety management means and methods. 
Highly structured capitalist societies such as the United States created entities that 
were ostensibly meant to protect the worker. Most notably is the creation, 
implementation, and sustainability of OSHA; yet Elling (1989) captures the dichotomy of 
this endeavor explaining that, at the intermediate level, the agents of expropriation 
function in favor of the capitalist class in an effort to alienate the working and peasant 
classes from the surplus value which they produce (labor theory of value). These include: 
the multinational and other concentrations of capital in competition for the highest rate of 
profit; nation states and their state powers (legal, military, clandestine force, and work 
inspectorates such as OSHA – the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the 
U.S.A.) which attempt to assure favorable conditions for what Marx termed general 
capital (not necessarily any particular firm, but capital in general); and a dynamic cultural 
hegemony which, if successful, encourages workers and peasants to cooperate in their 
own exploitation (p.1173). 
To that end, it is necessary to explore the connection between construction 
workplace safety and Marxist ideology. As a philosophical, socio-economic, and political 
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paradigm, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels saw the latter portion of the Nineteenth 
Century as a time not only wrought with social discontent, but also an opportunity to 
explore conflict and violence. This was an attempt to formulate a theoretical construct 
promulgated on the scientific pragmatism and rooted in the idea that imbalances in power 
and control between different classes will lead to conflict between those who were 
dominated and the parties and forces that keep them from realizing freedom and equality. 
Marx and Engels looked to analyze and understand the experience of the 
subjugated working class and the opportunity for self-emancipation. Communism, the 
phenomenon of class struggle, and more specifically, the movement away from the 
obstacles created by opposing interests and towards that of public ownership, offers 
further support for the present interplay and interdependence between upper and middle 
management among the construction workforce that emerges as conflict when accidents 
occur. 
The belief that history could be analyzed scientifically was also of great 
importance to Marx’s ideologies. They were recognized in his theory of Historical 
Materialism or the Materialist Conception of History. This theory was based on the 
model of Dialectical Materialism, an amalgamation of Hegel’s theory of Dialectics, 
giving substance to history rather than keeping it in the realm of idealism or spirituality. 
This concept gives further credence to proposed research within the field of construction 
safety management, as it is important to move from an idealistic approach to work safety 
to that of a concrete and action-oriented plan that clearly outlines policies and procedures, 
reflecting a top-down, bottom-up information loop. 
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Equally relevant is Marxism’s acknowledgement of both a cultural and 
institutionalized superstructure that supports the transition from one stage of socio- 
political and ultimately economic transformation to another. This would take place when 
discontent is replaced by upheaval and violence and as the dominant class is displaced by 
the development, implementation, and acceptance of new modes of thought and actions 
by a new emerging class based on newly established political ideologies (Burns, 2002). 
This focus on capital at the expense of safety is particularly relevant to a 
discussion of worker safety in the construction industry as there exists a history of 
placing production over safety. According to Marxist theory, safety is a commodity and 
has worth. The theory further explains that private industry can choose to disregard 
human capital, that of the worker, by not making safety a priority. This choice is often 
driven by a desire to avoid expenditures specifically focused on worker safety as a means 
of insulating profits. These decisions are reflected in leadership styles and perception of 
leadership styles, as well as climate of safety, the climate with the potential to become 
observable and in turn measurable in the form of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a 
combination of both. 
This sentiment of profits over people is supported by management, playing off 
gender roles, machismo, ethnicity, and a systemic hierarchy of power, and leadership that 
encourages the worker without proper access to information regarding safety. This leaves 
them with a false sense of security. In turn, Marx’s elite class would include the General 
Contractors, Site Safety Managers, Foremen and anyone directly charged with worker 
safety; they would also oversee protecting the capitol. This capitol can manifest as 
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information, education, and traditional profits. There is a misguided belief that it is more 
cost-effective to address safety based on perceived worker carelessness, risk takers, or 
accident-prone laborers rather than supporting the systemic nature of construction safety 
management (Elling, 1989).  
This revenue-centric focus, rooted in traditional Marxist Theory, is still pervasive 
today, as construction contracts reward early completion of tasks and often impose high 
monetary sanctions on not meeting project deadlines. As a result, safety is greatly 
undermined to protect profits.  
Beyond Traditional Marxism 
If the relevance of Marxism in a discussion of Construction Safety Management is 
to be explored, specifically the impact of Marxist constructs on the front-line worker, it is 
also important to highlight the reality that options do exist. While Marxism is rooted in 
the belief that worker exploitation leads to conflict between worker and manager, it does 
not fully take into account the potential for worker cooperatives, which would allow for 
labor to have a vested interest in the well-being of the company. This top-down bottom-
up approach is especially relevant to any discussion of worker safety. 
While it might be argued that the idea of worker cooperatives is outside the scope 
of this research, it is believed to be pertinent as it offers a lens through which to not only 
better understand Marxism, but also the potential for opportunities that support Marx’s 
belief that industry should be publicly held. It was also felt that industry should protect 
human capital while allowing for the continued development of the necessary economic 
health of a company. This protection was particularly important in construction, where 
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profit can be driven by unpredictable economic margins and indicators that were dictated 
by unforeseen forces such as weather, availability of a skilled workforce, and fluctuating 
indirect and direct costs of building materials. 
Although the integral synergy still exists, the capital-labor paradigm becomes 
more complex when seen through a worker cooperative capitalistic/Marxist lens. Yet the 
basic components deemed integral by Marx remain the same, as “workers sell their labor 
power to capital which appropriates the surplus values through the activities of 
management” (Egan, 1990, p.71). 
Also of importance is an understanding of the concepts of Formal Subordination 
and Real Subordination as it relates to Marxism. Since neo-classical views on the labor 
force support the concept that labor is a commodity, the inherent implication is that the 
relationship between management and the worker must be comprised of purely opposing 
goals and objectives. Therefore, the theoretical construct that the workforce is disposable 
and can be reestablished for each new project must be recognized (Gintis, 1976, p. 44). 
This belief for the need for an adversarial relationship between workers and management, 
although flawed, is in concert with similar beliefs in the construction industry. More 
appropriate is a recognition that the construction worker, Marx’s labor, is multi-faceted, 
not only representing the individual worker, but the power of that individual’s work 
including his or her ability to work and collaborate with others to increase productivity. 
This reality must be recognized for its multiplicities as it supports the marketplace but is 
consumed and controlled both within and separate from the market/workplace (Marx, 
1930, Chap. 6 Vol. 1; Gintis, 1976, pp. 36 -37). 
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Therefore, the Marxist paradigm is an appropriate means of expressing not only 
the potential of an employer’s control over the worker, but specifically in the construction 
industry, the modalities asserted by Marx regarding domination of the organization and 
subordination of the worker can be used as an expression of the potential for effective 
Construction Safety Management and a strong culture and climate of safety. The 
construction worksite, with the General Contractor in the seat of power, dictates that 
which governs both the labor force and the labor process (Stark 1978; Bowles & Ginitis 
1976, p. 42). This need not be a purely dichotomous construct, as management and 
workers can and should work together to keep the construction worksite as safe as 
possible, given the realities of such a hazardous industry. 
 To that end, a more traditional Marxist view is most appropriate when exploring 
the role of management and its impact on worker safety in the construction industry. 
Beyond the power of the purse, Marxism is as much about a much larger continuum of 
power and control as it is with control that management can execute and delegate work 
tasks that supersede organizational culture, including policies, procedures, manifestos, 
and even OSHA standards, and still justify and protect capital. 
This concept can be further expanded upon to include access to information and 
education, as both are resources; as such, by withholding training and information under 
the auspices of a worker’s “Right to Know”, akin to the capitalist principles of “trade 
secrets”, the worker is placed secondary to profits (Epstein, 1979). This philosophy of 
construction safety management simply does not work, and when explained through the 
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lens of Marxist Theory, is neither an effective nor efficient means of keeping the worker 
safe. 
Systems Theory 
Systems Theory is also applicable to this research. It is based on the premise that 
information is to be understood in the context of the totality of all the parts and not a 
process of segmentation. This is especially relevant today with the whole vs. the parts 
challenge that manifested during the last century into so-called systems theory 
(Bogdanov, 1922; von Bertalanffy, 1968; Laszlo, 1996; Meadows, 2008).  
Interdisciplinary in its construct, systems theory is highly adaptable as it can be applied 
not only to systemic occurrences found in nature, but can also be used to explain 
challenges that arise in various other spheres including those frameworks that comprise 
the psychological as well as socio-economic continuum of the workplace.   
At its core, a systems approach is built upon the belief that the focus must move 
from the part of the whole towards a unified and interactive understanding of phenomena, 
where the individual components are obscured by the more important correlation between 
them (Checkland, 1997; Weinberg, 2001; Jackson, 2001; Luhmann, 1990). 
The systemic framework, when understood as a unit that can be observed and 
therefore measured (Ng, Maull, and Yip, 2009), is an especially relevant aspect of the 
proposed research as it explores interactions and relationships between the parts of the 
entire system with a realization that the construction industry, as well as the individual 
job site, must be seen as components of both the conflict and the solution. As such, this 
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allows for the understanding of how the system, the construction industry, as well as the 
construction job site, is ordered, allowing for the ability to quantify safety outcomes.  
While the central concept of the theory is one which is focused on exchanges, 
these interactions must be further understood and categorized as open, closed, and 
isolated in their nature (Mele, Pels, & Polese, 2010). In an open system, the exchange of 
information energy and/or human capital exists as a result of the ability to interact and 
therefore be impacted externally by the environment. In a closed system, the exchange 
differs insofar as information remains within the system, whereas an insulated system is 
so far removed and inaccessible that energy has no opportunity to make contact or 
interact with any other forces reflecting 100% autonomy (Boulding, 1956; Katz & Kahn, 
1978).  The construction job site is a continuum, and as such must be seen as passing 
through all three stages.  Yet when it becomes closed or isolated for too long 
communication breaks down and worker safety is at risk (Checkland, 1997).  
To that end, these theories, in combination with the existing literature and 
critiques of said literature, act as both the foundation and explanation for construction 
safety. This is all done from a culture and conflict evaluation, offering the opportunity for 
exploration, in addition to an intact, yet limited body of research regarding the 
construction industry, which is an industry in transition and in conflict with itself. 
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Chapter 4: Methods  
Research Method 
The research method that was used was a quantitative approach comparing 
management leadership styles on climate of safety. The reason these variables were 
chosen was to reflect macro-level decisions (leadership styles) as well as micro-level 
outcomes (climate of safety) on the parts of key stakeholders as well as the worker who is 
involved in the actual tasks and as such, is most directly impacted by any unsafe acts, 
unsafe conditions, or a combination of both. 
Data was collected using an anonymous electronic survey sent out by the National 
Demolition Association (NDA) as well as Construction Today Magazine in an effort to 
capture the greatest sample size of both management and the front-line worker. Two 
surveys were chosen. The first was that of the Leadership Questionnaire as created by 
Zohar (1980) because of its ability to measure both real and perceived levels of 
organizational safety on the part of management as well as workers, focusing on the 
importance of safety held by each group.   
The second survey was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by 
construction safety management professionals and integrate these choices with the 
perception of management’s leadership style by the worker. First created and 
implemented by Jung, Jeong, and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and 
multifaceted character of the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration 
of a relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as 
well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of 
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leadership expectations of both the manager and the frontline worker, collectively giving 
greater insight into the top-down, bottom-up approach to construction safety 
management.  
Respondents were able to log in anonymously via the link to the online server and 
complete the survey. The survey was the same for all respondents and should have taken 
approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. 
The two surveys utilized by the researcher have been adapted only to reflect 
proper noun-verb agreement. They remained exactly the same in both form and content 
and the changes were merely to adhere to standard and accepted grammar. Specifically, 
this is reflected in the appropriate use of pronouns for the Manager and Worker Surveys 
where the manager was asked '' I " statements and where necessary and when evaluating 
his or her manager, the worker was asked about the manager in "he/she" and "his/her" 
statements that do not deviate from the content of the question. These are noted and 
reflected in the attached surveys in both the instructions as well as the body of the 
research tool. 
Both the NDA and Construction Today Magazine received a template letter/flyer 
to send out to their general membership as well as links to the survey that can be 
distributed. These organizations were asked to send out the survey in the form of web-
based mail to their opt-in members, as well as via their opt-in online newsletter to 
subscribers, all of whom hold managerial or worker status in the construction industry.  
The NDA is member driven and includes a membership fee; Construction Today 
is subscription based. This is important as it shows interest and motivation on the part of 
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those who join to utilize important industry information offered as well as share their own 
insights and feedback regularly via similar requests to complete surveys by both 
organizations throughout the year. Since safety has been identified as an important topic 
by both organizations, and due to the concise and user-friendly nature of the surveys, the 
researcher expected completion of the surveys within a timely manner.  
In each case, when the survey was sent out, the individual link for management 
vs. workers was clearly indicated so that the proper group utilized the appropriate link.  
Respondents were then able to click the link anonymously via the link to the online sever 
and complete the survey. Adhering to good and accepted research guidelines and 
practices, no protected health information (PHI) was included in any of the surveys, so a 
Web Link Collector (WLC) was utilized in an effort to capture a larger audience by 
giving respondents the ability to forward the survey via a unique link to any individual(s) 
they believed fit the requirement. Furthermore, for added protection SSL encryption was 
utilized, as it improved security by encrypting surveys and survey results. 
As noted, a (WLC) was included in the electronic survey. When the respondent 
forwarded the link, the recipient only received a blank copy of the survey and did not 
have access to the sender’s answers. This helped to ensure that when forwarded, the 
recipient was not intentionally or unintentionally influenced by the sender's responses. 
Research Questions 
Research Question One (RQ1): Is there a relationship between management’s 
leadership style and climate of safety? 
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 Null hypothesis (Ho1): There is no relationship between participatory leadership 
style and the climate of safety. 
 Alternate hypothesis (H1): Managers who adopt a more inclusive and 
participatory leadership styles are more likely to rank higher on the climate of 
safety. 
 Null hypothesis (Ho2): There is no relationship between autocratic leadership 
style and the climate of safety. 
 Alternate hypothesis (H2): Managers who adopt a more autocratic leadership 
styles were less likely to rank higher on the climate of safety. 
 Null hypothesis (Ho3):  There is no relationship between free rein leadership style 
and the climate of safety. 
 Alternate hypothesis (H2): Compared to their counterparts, managers who adopt 
more free rein leadership styles were neither less likely nor more likely to 
prioritize the climate of safety. 
Research Question Two (RQ2): Is there a relationship between worker’s 
perception of leadership style and the climate of safety? 
 Null hypothesis (Ho4): There is no relationship between worker’s perception of 
participatory leadership style and their perception regarding the climate of safety. 
 Alternate hypothesis (H4):  Workers who perceive their managers as participatory 
are more likely to prioritize the climate of safety. 
 Null hypothesis (Ho5): There is no relationship between worker’s perception of 
autocratic leadership style and their perception regarding the climate of safety. 
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 Alternate hypothesis (H5):  Workers who perceive managers as autocratic are less 
likely to perceive their safety as being a workplace priority. 
 Null hypothesis (Ho6): There is no relationship between worker’s perception of 
free rein leadership style and their perception regarding the climate of safety. 
 Alternate hypothesis (H6):  Workers who perceive managers to free rein are less 
likely to perceive their safety as being a workplace priority. 
Research Question 3 (RQ2): Is there a relationship between the size of the 
workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and their perception regarding the climate of 
safety? 
 Null hypothesis (Ho7): There is no relationship between the size of the 
workforce, the manager’s leadership style, and their perception regarding the 
climate of safety. 
 Alternate hypothesis (H7):  Leaders who manage a small team and who ascribe to 
a participatory style of leadership are more likely to score high regarding the 
climate of safety when compared to autocratic leaders with a large sized 
workforce. 
Surveys 
The first two versions of the survey for this study, one created for management 
and one for the worker, are constructed in three parts. Part One was created by the 
researcher and is comprised of 11 questions used to capture necessary demographical 
information. The categories utilized are consistent with those used by the Bureau of 
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Labor Statistics for collecting similar data across all industries in the United States. Part 
Two consists of 13 questions asking for the manager to rate his or her leadership style. 
The same questions, with changes made only to noun-verb agreement, are also 
used with respondents in the worker category, asking them to rate the leadership style of 
the highest-level manager with whom they have contact with at least once a week. The 
questions for both groups involve leadership styles described by three styles: 1) 
Autocratic, 2) Participatory, and 3) Free Rein as these are consistent with the research 
methodology found to be most effective by the creators (Jung, Jeong, & Mills, 2014) and 
equally applicable by the researcher for this study. Part Three asks respondents in both 
samples to circle or check the answer that most represents how strongly they feel about a 
specific statement. Again, only the noun-verb agreement has been adjusted to apply to 
management and the worker, having no bearing on the content of the question. 
The techniques utilized by all forms of this survey are conveyed by answers in the 
form of fill-in-the-blank or Likert-type scales. Since Part One endeavors to capture 
necessary demographical information, it also implements, to a very limited degree, the 
use of open-ended/fill-in-the-blank questions in which the participants were be expected 
to type a response: 
1. What is your highest educational level? 
a. Rationale: This is the first out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Answers include: Did Not Complete High School, High School/GED, Some 
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College, Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree, Advanced Graduate Work, or 
PhD. 
2. What is your degree? (Check all that apply) 
a. Rationale: This is the second out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Answers include: Other, Engineering, Construction, Architecture, 
Construction Safety Management, and None of the Above.  
3. What is your current Union Affiliation? 
a. Rationale: This is the third out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Answers include: Yes or No.  
4. How many years have you worked in the construction industry? 
a. Rationale: This is the fourth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Participant enters the answer manually.  
5. How many years have you worked in your present trade? 
a. Rationale: This is the fifth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
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States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Participants enters the answers manually.  
6. Have you ever taken a leadership program? 
a. Rationale: This is the sixth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Answers include: Yes or No.  
7. What is your Age? 
a. Rationale: This is the seventh out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Participants input the answers.  
8. What is your Race? 
a. Rationale: This is the eighth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Answers include: White/Caucasian, Hispanic or Latino, Other, Asian, 
American Indian or Alaskan, and Black or African American.  
9. What is your Gender? 
a. Rationale: This is the ninth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
78 
 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Answers include: Male or Female. 
10. What Region of the country do you work in most often? 
a. Rationale: This is the tenth out of eleven questions chosen for this survey to 
capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Respondent enters the figures manually. 
11. What size company do you work for most often? 
a. Rationale: This is the eleventh out of eleven questions chosen for this survey 
to capture necessary demographical information consistent with the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. 
Respondent enters the figures manually.  
12. Leadership style can be described into three styles: 1) Autocratic, 2) Participatory, 
and 3) Free Rein. When answering the questions below please rate YOUR 
PERSONAL leadership style. For the worker, it read: Leadership style can be 
described by three styles: 1) Autocratic, 2) Participatory, and 3) Free Rein. When 
answering the questions below please rate the leadership style of the highest-level 
Supervisor you have contact with at least once a week. Based on leadership styles 
above, please check, from your perspective, the appropriate leadership style in 
decision-making for position worked below. 
a. Rationale: This question was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by 
construction safety management professionals and integrate these choices with 
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the perception of management’s leadership style by the worker. First created 
and implemented by Jung, Jeong and Mills (2014), it reflects the 
interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of the construction jobsite and as 
such, allows for an exploration of the relationship between leadership 
preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as well as offering a better 
understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of leadership 
expectations of both the manager and the frontline worker collectively. This 
portion of the survey used a multiple-choice format. The answers were 
responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Always, and Often. 
13. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Make sure the majority rules. 
a. Rationale: This question was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by 
construction safety management professionals and integrate these choices with 
the perception of management’s leadership style by the worker. First created 
and implemented by Jung, Jeong and Mills (2014), it reflects the 
interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of the construction jobsite and as 
such, allows for an exploration of the relationship between leadership 
preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as well as offering a better 
understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of leadership 
expectations of both the manager and the frontline worker collectively. This 
portion of the survey uses a Likert-type scale. The answers were responded to 
as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Always, and Often. 
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14. When making decision in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Persuade others to do things my way. 
a. Rationale: This question is the second of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker.  First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong, 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
15. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Tell others what to do. 
a. Rationale: This question is the third of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
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relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
16. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Turn decision over to others. 
a. Rationale: This question is the fourth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
17. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Share my own ideas. 
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a. Rationale: This question is the fifth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
18. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Suggest a decision to others. 
a. Rationale: his question is the sixth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
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real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
19. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Rely on my own judgment. 
a. Rationale: This question is the seventh of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker.  First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
20. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Participate just like any other person. 
a. Rationale: This question is the eighth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
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professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
21. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Make my own decision. 
a. Rationale: This question is the ninth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker.  First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
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scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
22. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Provide resources to others. 
a. Rationale: This question is the tenth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offers a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
23. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Ask others to brainstorm choices. 
a. Rationale: This question is the eleventh of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker.  First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
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and Mills (2014), it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
24. When making decisions in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Gather others’ feedback before deciding. 
a. Rationale: This question is the twelfth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014) it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
87 
 
25. When making decision in a team-working environment, I act in the following 
ways: Refer to contracts for direction. 
a. Rationale: This question is the twelfth of twelve questions and was chosen to 
measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and integrate these choices with the perception of management’s 
leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, Jeong 
and Mills (2014) it reflects the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of 
the construction jobsite and as such, allows for an exploration of the 
relationship between leadership preference on the overall efficacy when 
utilized, as well as offering a better understanding regarding the perceived and 
real perception of leadership expectations of both the manager and the 
frontline worker collectively. This portion of the survey uses a Likert-type 
scale. The answers were responded to as follows: Never, Rarely, Sometimes, 
Always, and Often. 
26. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: React quickly to solve the problem 
when told about safety hazards. 
a. Rationale: This is the first question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
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The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
27. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Insist on thorough and regular safety 
audits and inspections. 
a. Rationale: This is the second question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
28.  Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Try to continually improve safety 
levels in each department. 
a. Rationale: This is the third question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
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29. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Provide all the equipment needed to 
do the job safely. 
a. Rationale: This is the fourth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
30. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Strict about working safely when 
work falls behind schedule. 
a. Rationale: This is the fifth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
31. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
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priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Quickly correct any safety hazard 
(even if it’s costly). 
a. Rationale: This is the sixth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
32. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Provide detailed safety reports to 
workers (e.g., injuries, near accidents). 
a. Rationale: This is the seventh question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
33. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Considers a worker’s safety 
behavior when moving–promoting people. 
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a. Rationale: This is the eighth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
34. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Require each manager to help 
improve safety in his/her department. 
a. Rationale: This is the ninth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
35. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Invest a lot of time and money in 
safety training for workers. 
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a. Rationale: This is the tenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980) because of its ability to measure both real and 
perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
36. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Use any available information to 
improve existing safety rules. 
a. Rationale: This is the eleventh question out of sixteen questions chosen for 
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real 
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as 
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each 
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low 
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
37. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Listen carefully to workers’ ideas 
about improving safety. 
a.  Rationale: This is the twelfth question out of sixteen questions chosen for this 
survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real and 
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perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as well as 
workers; thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each group. 
The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low Priority, 
Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
38. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Consider safety when setting 
production speed and schedules. 
a. Rationale: This is the thirteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for 
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real 
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as 
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each 
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low 
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
39. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Provide workers with a lot of 
information on safety issues. 
a. Rationale: This is the fourteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for 
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real 
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as 
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each 
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group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low 
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential. 
40. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to-day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Regularly holds safety-awareness 
events (e.g., presentations, ceremonies). 
a. Rationale: This is the fifteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for 
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real 
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as 
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each 
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low 
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.  
41. Safety Climate focuses on the day-to- day interaction between policies, 
procedures, and workers. Please rate your personal perception on the level of 
priority of each as it relates to job site safety: Give safety personnel the power 
they need to do their job. 
a. Rationale: This is the sixteenth question out of sixteen questions chosen for 
this survey created by Zohar (1980), because of its ability to measure both real 
and perceived levels of organizational safety on the part of management as 
well as workers, thereby focusing on the importance of safety held by each 
group. The answers were responded to as follows: Not A Priority, Low 
Priority, Medium Priority, High Priority, and Essential.  
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Participants 
The sample population for this research included data for individuals in the 
private construction industry of all sizes across the entire United States. While the data 
may not be reflective of all fifty states, the sample of between 75 and 150 respondents 
reflects the Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western regions of the country, including 
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. This sample population was comprised of 
adults 18 years of age or older, and as well as the following socio-economic statuses: 
Education, employment, inclusion in a leadership program of any kind, age, race, gender, 
and region of the country where they work in the construction industry most frequently. 
The aim of utilizing this group was to have the ability to effectively generalize results 
from the sample to better apply the results to the general construction industry (Babbie, 
1990; Creswell, 2009). 
Materials 
Two instruments were utilized for this research. These research instruments 
captured data of the sample populations in the form of an online survey. The survey was 
in English only, and asked respondents to answer questions that were nearly identical, 
albeit with changes in noun-verb agreement to make the questions understandable and 
grammatically correct when applied to a sample of management vs. construction workers. 
To that end, only those respondents who were literate in English and had access to 
Internet and computers, tablets, or smart phones could participate and be included in this 
study. 
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Each survey consisted of a part one created by the researcher, and comprised 11 
questions that collected demographic information consistent with the United States 
Bureau of Labor Statistic’s classifications for collecting industry data. The first survey 
was chosen to measure preferred leadership styles by construction safety management 
professionals and workers and integrated these choices with the perception of 
management’s leadership style by the worker. First created and implemented by Jung, 
Jeong and Mills (2014), it reflected the interdisciplinary and multifaceted character of the 
construction jobsite. It allowed for an exploration of the relationship between leadership 
preference on the overall efficacy when utilized, as well as offering a better 
understanding regarding the perceived and real perception of leadership expectations of 
both the manager and the frontline worker. Collectively, greater insight into the top-
down, bottom-up approach to construction safety management was provided. 
The second survey, created by Zohar (1980), was chosen because of its ability to 
measure both real and perceived levels of organizational safety, on the part of 
management as well as workers. It focused on the importance of safety held by each 
group. 
Design and Procedure 
This research utilized a quantitative methodology. The focus of the study was to 
examine the correlation between management’s leadership styles and the impact on 
climate of safety, as this has the most far-reaching influence on worker safety. This was 
accomplished by examining macro, mezzo and micro-level constructs of leadership styles 
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as well as perceived climate of safety as a means of measuring from a top-down and 
bottom-up approach. 
The researcher endeavored to study and create a reliable measurement tool to 
gauge the level of construction safety on the jobsite. This was accomplished by moving 
beyond the traditional lagging indicators, which support reactive safety policy and 
protocols, and focusing on leadership styles of those charged with keeping the worker 
safe. Additionally, this study was concerned with a more comprehensive understanding 
regarding the perceived leadership style by the worker, focusing on whom he or she 
identifies to be in charge of their day-to-day safety, leading to a deeper understanding of 
each group’s perception of safety climate at their construction jobsite. 
The quantitative analysis regarding accident causation, or more specifically, the 
means and methods by which it is prioritized and operationalized, allowed for new 
insights into the way in which macro, mezzo, and micro-level entities in the construction 
industry integrate both individual and group epistemological assumptions of leadership, 
leadership styles, safety and ultimately safety climate in an effort to keep the construction 
job site free of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a combination of both. 
Research Design  
The intention of the surveys was to collectively gain greater insight into the 
macro-level issues related to construction safety management, how management 
perceives their role, and to further define the impact these forces have on the frontline 
worker. 
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Each survey had 11 demographic variables as a means of classifying respondents 
into various groupings. This delineation also helped to recognize if there were any 
unexpected or unforeseen statistical correlations among the variables, which included 
level of education, degree, union affiliation, years in the industry, years worked in present 
trade, inclusion in a leadership training course, age, race, gender, and region of the 
country worked. 
The study further investigated the impact of particular variables and the resulting 
impact these variables had on the ability to manage effectively in an extremely hazardous 
industry such as construction. Systemically, it also allowed for the ability to gauge any 
differences in the perception of the macro and micro level entities of management and 
worker, regarding perceptions of leadership style and climate of safety. Subsequently, 
this research was also a barometer for safety mindfulness and responsiveness. 
Leadership styles and perceived climate of safety were measured as a means of 
investigating the potential quantitative correlation between a specific leadership style and 
climate of safety on the construction jobsite. While concrete leadership styles were 
scientifically evaluated, equally important was the measurement of both management’s 
and workers’ perception of safety, which reflects the systemic nature of the industry and 
the inherent potential, when strong, to keep the worker safe, and when undermined, put 
him or her at greater risk of injury. 
Strategy and Measurement  
The analysis was conducted with SPSS, which calculated statistical data. Equally 
important, it allowed for the analysis of inferential statistics (cross tabulation and 
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correlation). The researcher also explored any statistically relevant outcomes based on the 
demographic information acquired. This provided a means of verifying if this information 
had any bearing on leadership styles and perceived climate of safety. 
 An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was utilized to further determine and measure 
the influence of leadership style as described by management, leadership of management 
as seen by the worker, and perceived climate of safety as described by both groups 
respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
This research utilized quantitative methods by means of a twenty-eight-question 
survey. This tool gathered general demographic information as well as more specific 
characteristics from respondents, including the perception of the general importance of 
the construction contract, specific perception of the importance the construction contract 
gives regarding safety, level of education, any specific degrees held, union affiliation 
(e.g. union versus non-union), overall years worked in the construction industry, number 
of years working in present trade, involvement in any leadership program(s), the state in 
which he/she presently works, size of company (number of employees), years worked in 
the construction industry and years worked in present trade.  
Perception of leadership style on the part of both workers and managers was 
measured by utilizing a fourteen-question quiz, the Survey of Construction Managerial 
Leadership Styles, designed by Younghan Jung and Thomas H. Mills (2014) and an 
adapted sixteen-question Safety Climate Scale originally designed by Dov Zohar (1980) 
to measure perception of climate of safety. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Current U.S. State of Residence. The goal of all instruments was to acquire a 
sample of 150 total respondents equal to, or greater than, 75 managers and 75 workers, all 
of whom would reflect anonymous participants from the fifty United States, including 
Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico, with a minimum requirement of 150 total respondents 
for statistical significance. The survey was launched online, utilizing the help of the 
National Demolition Association (NDA) and Construction Today Magazine (CTM) to 
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gain further amplification and access by the industry. Respondents were further urged to 
share the survey link with professional peers appropriate for this study via email and 
social media platforms. A total of 530 participants took the survey, 314 managers and 
203 workers completed it in its entirety totaling 513, with 17 incompletes. This tool 
demonstrates geographical representation with the sample reflecting states 48 of the 50 
contiguous states, excluding responses from Montana and New Mexico, as well as 
Washington, D.C.  and Puerto Rico. The state with the highest number of respondents 
was California (62), followed by Florida (36) and Texas (32). The other states 
represented a range of 1 to 28 regarding participation: Alabama (11), Alaska (1), Arizona 
(11), Arkansas (4), Colorado (11), Connecticut (5), Delaware (2), Georgia (22), Hawaii 
(3), Idaho (4), Illinois (19), Indiana (10), Iowa (6), Kansas (5), Kentucky (10), Louisiana 
(9), Maine (3), Maryland (4), Massachusetts (15), Michigan (18), Minnesota (12), 
Mississippi (4), Missouri (8), Nebraska (3), Nevada (3), New Hampshire (1), New Jersey 
(11), New York (28), North Carolina (18), Ohio (18), Oklahoma (2), Oregon (8), 
Pennsylvania (20), Rhode Island (5), South Carolina (4), South Dakota (2), Tennessee 
(9), Utah (6), Vermont (1), Virginia (7), Washington (9), West Virginia (1), Wisconsin 
(9), Wyoming (1). (See Figure 5 below).  
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Figure 5.U.S. state of residence of participants. 
Gender. The respondents had two choices regarding gender, Male or Female.  A 
total of 504 participants responded to this question, with 26 choosing not to answer; of 
the 504 who did respond, 71.43 percent identified as male with the remaining 28.57 
percent identifying as female. (See Figure 6 below).  
 
Figure 6. Gender of participants. 
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Age. The survey participants had to manually enter age, a distinction that is 
noteworthy when compared with the use of a range, often associated with other 
instruments. A total of 511 participants responded with 19 choosing to decline to answer. 
The associated histogram reflects the mean age of respondents as (M=36.51) with a 
standard deviation of 10.30. (See Figure 7 below).  
 
Figure 7. Distribution of participants’ ages. 
Race. The diversity of race and/or ethnicity in the construction industry has 
historically been reflected in its work force and on the jobsite. Subsequently, this survey 
endeavored to mirror this multiplicity, understanding that individual workers and 
managers may identify themselves utilizing more traditional categories, while others may 
feel more comfortable with self-created or emerging classifications.  For this reason, this 
question was created to have both fixed responses including a choice for “other” as a 
means of capturing a response rather than risking losing the participant’s response. The 
selections included: White/Caucasian, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, American Indian or 
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Alaska Native, Black or African American and Other. There were 504 respondents who 
answered with 26 choosing to not to respond. Those who responded reflected the 
following results, with 69.8 percent identifying as White/Caucasian, 10.8 percent 
Hispanic or Latino, 2.5 percent as Asian, .80 percent American Indian or Alaska Native 
8.3 percent Black or African American and 3.0 percent as “Other.” (See Figure 8 below).  
 
Figure 8. Distribution of participants’ race/ethnicity 
Years working in the construction industry. In a continued effort to collect the 
most comprehensive data to best understand the sample, respondents were asked how 
long they had worked cumulatively in the construction industry. The question was open-
ended, allowing the respondents to manually enter a numerical value. The associated 
histogram reflects the mean age of respondents as (M=11.59) with a standard deviation of 
8.24. There were 511 respondents who answered this question and 19 who chose not to 
respond.  The greatest number of years in the industry was (10) at 10.2 percent followed 
by (15) at 9.8 percent and (20) at 8.8 percent with the other. (See Figure 9 below). 
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Figure 9. Years working in the construction industry. 
Years working in present trade. Recognizing that as in any industry workers 
often have a multiplicity of skills, this question asked respondents to focus on the 
area/trade in which they were working in the construction industry at the time they took 
the survey. The associated histogram reflects a mean age of respondents as (M=10.15) 
with a standard deviation of 7.80.  There were 506 respondents who answered the 
question and 24 who chose not to answer. The question was open-ended, allowing the 
respondents to manually enter a numerical value. The greatest number of years working 
in their present trade was (11) at 11.3 percent followed by (5) at 9.1 percent and (15) at 
7.5 percent. (See Figure 10 below).  
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Figure 10. Years working in present trade. 
Education level. In this portion, the survey respondents were asked to designate 
their highest level of completed education. The question was constructed offering the 
following selections: Did not complete High School, High School/GED, Some college, 
Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, Advanced graduate work or PhD. There were 511 
respondents with 19 choosing not to answer. Those who responded reflected the 
following results: 2.136 percent of the participants did not complete High School, 26.99 
percent indicated completing High School or obtaining a GED, 34.37 percent had some 
college, 24.08 percent a Bachelor’s degree, 10.1 percent a Master’s degree and 2.33 
percent had been involved in Advanced graduate work or held a PhD. (See Figure 11 
below).   
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Figure 11. Education level 
Type of college degrees. Understanding that the construction industry is 
comprised of a multi-faceted work force, which is further reflected in an interdisciplinary 
cross-section of college degrees on the part workers and managers, this question aimed to 
gather greater specificity from those with college degrees.  Therefore, it was constructed 
to provide both fixed and open-ended responses and allowed for multiple categories to be 
checked, including the option to manually add a specialized degree in the box marked 
“Other”.  The selections were: Engineering, Construction, Architecture, Construction 
Safety Management, None of the above and “Other”. There were 510 respondents with 
20 choosing not to respond. Of those who responded, the results were: 14.31 percent 
reported having an Engineering degree, 31.76 percent a Construction degree, 3.53 percent 
a degree in Architecture, 9.02 percent Construction Safety Management, 31.76 None of 
the above, and 9.61 percent “Other”.  Those choosing the “Other” option responded with 
the following: Accounting, Automotive, Aviation, Bachelor of Arts, Business 
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Management, Business, Certificated, Computer Drafting, Communications, Cook, 
Counter-Terrorism, CPA, Education, Elementary Education, Finance, General Contractor 
licensed by state, Heavy Equipment Operator, High School GED, Healthcare, HVAC, 
Human Biology, Industrial Design, IT Technology, Janitor, Management Medical 
Assistant, No, Nursing, Other, Occupational Safety and Health, Ok, On Job certification 
training, Paralegal Technology and Business Management, Private Investigator and 
Science. (See Figure 12 below).  
 
Figure 12. Specialized college degree. 
Union Affiliation. The construction industry is comprised of both Union and 
Non-Union workers. As a result, it was important to include this question regarding union 
status as a means of capturing the most well-rounded profile of those who responded. The 
selections included: Union and Non-Union.  There were 511 respondents and 19 
choosing not to respond. Those who responded reflected the following results: 30.53 
percent identified as Union workers and 69.47 percent as Non-Union workers. (See 
Figure 13 below).  
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Figure 13. Union affiliation. 
Size of Organization. Because the construction industry is comprised of various 
sized companies, this question was asked to better understand the size of the organization 
based on number of employees. The selections included: 1-50, 51-250, 251-500, 501-
1000, 1001+. There were 504 respondents who chose to answer and 26 who did not. 
Those who responded reflected the following results: 47.82 percent reported working in 
companies with 1-50 employees, 24.40 percent with 51-250 employees, 14.48 percent 
with 251-500 employees, 6.94 percent with 501-1000 employees and 6.40 percent 
reporting 1001 or more. (See Figure 14 below). 
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Figure 14. Size of 0rganization 
Leadership Training. While not all workers will ever realize 
managerial/leadership roles, this question was utilized to better understand how familiar 
the sample of respondents was with basic leadership concepts. The selections included: 
yes or no. There were 513 responses with 17 individuals choosing not to respond. Those 
who responded indicated that 51.66 percent answered yes and 48.34 answered no. (See 
Figure 15 below).  
 
Figure 15. Leadership program 
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Leadership Style. Building on the desire for a deeper understanding of how those 
taking the survey perceived either their personal leadership style or that of their 
supervisor, respondents were asked to refer to an explanation of three leadership styles, 
specifically that of the autocratic, participatory, or free rein leadership and associated 
traits as outlined in the brief description accompanying the question. Given these 
selections: autocratic, participatory, or free rein, there were 499 responses and 31 
individuals who chose not to respond. The responses showed that 25.65 percent identified 
with those qualities of an autocratic leader, 61.92 percent with that of a participatory 
leader and 12.42 percent with that of a free rein leadership style. (See Figure 16 below).  
 
Figure 16. Perceived leadership style. 
The Construction Contract. The means and methods associated with completing 
a construction project are reflected in the construction contract. To that end, the 
perception of the importance of this document is also integral in understanding the 
sample of respondents. This question was constructed based on the Likert model and 
consisted of the following selections: Not very important, Not important, Neither, 
Important, and Very important. There were 525 individuals in the sample who responded 
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and 5 who did not. The responses showed that 1.33 percent deemed the construction 
contract as Not very important, 1.14 percent as Not important, 2.48 percent as neither, 
28.95 percent as Important and 66.10 percent as Very important. (See Figure 17 below). 
 
Figure 17. The construction contract. 
The Construction Contract and Safety. While awareness of the contract offers 
insight, understanding this level of awareness, especially as it relates to safety, is yet 
another means of building a comprehensive profile of those who responded to the survey. 
This question regarding the importance of the construction contract regarding safety was 
constructed to do just that by utilizing the same Likert scale as that used in the prior 
contract question consisting of the following selections: Not very important, Not 
important, neither, Important and Very important. There were 524 individuals in the 
sample who responded and 6 who chose not to respond. These responses regarding the 
construction contract and safety indicated that 0.76 percent deemed it Not very important, 
1.15 percent Not important, 2.10 percent as neither, 19.08 percent Important and 76.91 
percent as Very important. (See Figure 18 below). 
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Figure 18. The construction contract and safety. 
The Construction Contract: Safety Policies and Procedures. This question was 
posed in a continued effort to understand the extent to which the sample perceived the 
importance of the construction contract as a safety tool. This was achieved by 
constructing a yes or no question regarding awareness of the existence of safety policies, 
procedures, and protocols within a standard construction contract. There were 501 
respondents and 29 who chose not to respond. The responses indicated that 88.62 percent 
answered yes to an awareness of such components in the standard construction contract 
with 11.38 percent responding no. (See Figure 19 below).  
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Figure 19. Awareness of safety policies and procedures  
Perception of safety. The construction job site is not without hazards, and the 
construction contract can be used to mitigate risk of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or a 
combination of both.  As such, perception of safety is an important factor in 
understanding those who chose to take part in this survey. Subsequently, they were asked 
an open-ended question allowing them to manually input a numeric value utilized to 
measure the number of times in the last 30 days he or she perceived feeling unsafe (on 
the part of worker) or received reports of feeling unsafe (on the part of the manager). The 
associated histogram reflects a mean of (M=1.33) with a standard deviation of 3.70. 
There were 492 respondents who answered the question and 38 who chose not to 
respond. The greatest number regarding feeling unsafe on the jobsite was 60.2 percent 
reporting they never felt unsafe followed by 10.4 percent who felt unsafe one time and 
9.6 percent who felt unsafe two times, 4.3 percent felt unsafe (3) times, 1.1 percent (4) 
times, 2.1 percent (5) times, 1.1 percent (6) times, .40 percent (7 ) times, .60 percent (8) 
times,  .90 percent (10) times, .20 percent (11) times, .60 percent (12) times, .40 percent 
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(15) times, .20 percent (20) times, .20 percent (22) times, .40 percent ( 30 times) and .20 
percent (45) times. (See Figure 20 below). 
 
Figure 20. Perception of safety. 
Managers, Workers, and the Climate of Safety 
Managers by importance of the construction contract. A Chi-square test of 
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between management status 
(manager versus worker) and the importance of construction contract. Participants were 
asked to rate the importance of the construction contract with answers ranging from not 
very important, not important, neither, important, and very important. The relationship 
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=517) = 21.59, p<.001. (See Figure 21 
below). 
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Figure 21. Managers by importance of the construction contract. 
Table 1 
Managers by Importance of the Construction Contract 
Chi-Square Tests for Manager by Importance of the Construction Contract 
 Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.107
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 22.075 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 21.591   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.238
c
 1 .072 .081
b
 .074 .088 
N of Valid Cases 517      
a. 5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 624387341. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.800. 
 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and the importance of the construction contract. The Cramer’s V was 
.21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. While both managers 
and workers value construction contract, 72.9% of managers viewed it as very important, 
compared to workers at 56.2%. Conversely, 40.4% of workers viewed the construction 
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contract as important, compared to managers at 21.7%.  As such, managers and workers 
differed in how they view the construction contract. 
Manager’s perception of the importance of the construction contract 
regarding safety. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to determine the 
relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and the importance of 
construction contract regarding safety. Participants were asked to rate the importance of 
the construction contract with answers ranging from not very important, not important, 
neither, important, and very important. The relationship between these variables was 
significant,  2(4, N=513) = 11.89, p=.012. (See Figure 22 below). 
 
Figure 22. Manager’s perception of the importance of the construction contract regarding 
safety  
  
118 
 
Table 2 
Chi-square test of managers by importance of construction contract regarding safety. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.030
a
 4 .017 .013
b
 .010 .016 
Likelihood Ratio 11.825 4 .019 .031
b
 .027 .036 
Fisher's Exact Test 11.886   .012
b
 .009 .015 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.426
c
 1 .064 .067
b
 .060 .073 
N of Valid Cases 513      
a. 5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.58. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 957002199. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.851. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and the importance of the construction contract regarding safety. The 
Cramer’s V was .15, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such, 
managers were more likely to rate the construction contract regarding safety as very 
important (81.7%), compared to workers (69.8%). Conversely, workers were more likely 
to view the construction contract regarding safety as important (26.2%) when compared 
to managers (14.5%). The graph on page 127 depicts this relationship.  
Manger by Education. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
level of education. Participants were asked to report the highest level of education they 
have completed, with answers ranging from did not complete high school, high school or 
GED, some college, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and advanced graduate work or 
PhD. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(5, N=503) = 38.55, 
p<.001. (See Figure 23 below). 
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Figure 23. Manager by education. 
Table 3 
Manager by Education  
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 37.829
a
 5 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 40.021 5 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 38.553   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
35.384
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 503      
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.26. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 92208573. 
c. The standardized statistic is -5.948. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and level of education. The Cramer’s V was .27, suggesting a moderate 
association between the two variables. As such, managers were more likely to have 
completed Bachelor’s degree (28.6%) compared to workers, (16.9%) as well as Master’s 
degrees (14.0%) compared to workers (4.6%). Conversely, workers were more likely to 
have completed only some high school or GED (37.4%) compared to managers 
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(19.16%), and more likely to have completed some college (37.95%) when compared to 
managers (32.8%). The graph above depicts this relationship. 
Manager by taken a leadership program. A Chi-square test of independence 
was calculated to determine the relationship between management status (manager versus 
worker) and attendance in a leadership program. Participants were asked to report 
whether they had taken a leadership program by answering either yes or no. The 
relationship between these variables was significant,  2(1, N=501) = 52.23, p<.001. (See 
Figure 24 below). 
 
Figure 24. Manager by taken a leadership program.  
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Table 4 
Manager by Taken a Leadership Program 
Chi-Square Tests
c
 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 52.233
a
 1 .000 .000 
Continuity Correction
b
 50.916 1 .000  
Likelihood Ratio 53.224 1 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 52.129
d
 1 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 501    
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 94.58. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. For 2x2 crosstabulation, exact results are provided instead of Monte Carlo results. 
d. The standardized statistic is 7.220. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and attendance in a leadership program. The Cramer’s V was .32, 
suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As such, managers were 
more likely to have taken a leadership program (64.4%) compared to workers (31.3%). 
The graph below depicts this relationship.  
Manager by leadership styles. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
leadership style. Participants were asked to determine their type of leadership style with 
answers ranging from autocratic to participatory and free rein. The relationship between 
these variables was significant,  2(2, N=489) = 9.80, p=.008. 
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Figure 25. Manager by leadership styles. 
Table 5 
Manager by Leadership Styles 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.908
a
 2 .007 .007
b
 .005 .009 
Likelihood Ratio 9.849 2 .007 .008
b
 .006 .010 
Fisher's Exact Test 9.795   .008
b
 .006 .010 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.475
c
 1 .002 .002
b
 .001 .003 
N of Valid Cases 489      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.80. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 79654295. 
c. The standardized statistic is 3.078. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and type of leadership style. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a 
weak association between the two variables. As such, managers were more likely to have 
an autocratic leadership style (29.3%) compared to workers (20.1%). Conversely, 
workers were more likely to have free rein leadership style (16.9%) when compared to 
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managers (9.0%). Additionally, both managers (61.7%) and workers (63.0%) had similar 
rates of participatory leadership styles.  
Manager by implementation of a successful safety program. A Chi-square test 
of independence was calculated to determine the relationship between management status 
(manager versus worker) and whether their organization has implemented a successful 
safety program. Participants were asked to rate their organization having a successful 
safety program with answers ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or 
disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The relationship between these variables was 
significant,  2(4, N=496) = 12.34, p=.014.   
 
Figure 26. Manager by implementation of a successful safety program. 
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Table 6 
Manager by Implementation of a Successful Safety Program 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.759
a
 4 .013 .011
b
 .009 .014 
Likelihood Ratio 12.465 4 .014 .016
b
 .013 .020 
Fisher's Exact Test 12.338   .014
b
 .011 .017 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.805
c
 1 .094 .101
b
 .093 .108 
N of Valid Cases 496       
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.81. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1810951851. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.675. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and whether they agree that their organization implemented a 
successful safety program. The Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak association 
between the two variables. As such, managers were slightly more likely to agree that their 
organization had implemented a successful safety program (68.8%), compared to workers 
(63.5%). The graph above depicts this relationship. 
Manager by commitment to safety. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between management status (manager versus 
worker) and top managers having a strong commitment to safety. Participants were asked 
to rate their level of agreement that top managers have a strong commitment to safety, 
with answers ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, 
and strongly agree. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, 
N=493) = 11.60, p=.017. 
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Figure 27. Manager by commitment to safety. 
Table 7 
Manager by Commitment to Safety 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.907
a
 4 .018 .015
b
 .012 .018 
Likelihood Ratio 11.612 4 .020 .021
b
 .017 .024 
Fisher's Exact Test 11.598   .017
b
 .014 .020 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.534
c
 1 .111 .117
b
 .109 .125 
N of Valid Cases 493      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.01. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 762367465. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.592. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and top managers having a strong commitment to safety. The 
Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such, 
managers were slightly more likely to agree that top managers have a strong commitment 
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to safety (64.8%), compared to workers (56.3%) and were also more likely to strongly 
agree (19.9%), compared to workers (18.2%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by prioritize safety on a daily basis. A Chi-square test of 
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between management status 
(manager versus worker) and whether their direct manager prioritizes safety on a daily 
basis. Participants were asked to rate the level that they agree that their direct manager 
prioritizes safety, with answers ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or 
disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The relationship between these variables was not 
significant,  2(4, N=495) = 9.50, p=.051. 
 
Figure 28. Manager by prioritize safety on a daily basis. 
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Table 8 
Manager by Prioritizing Safety on a Daily Basis 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.667
a
 4 .046 .048
b
 .042 .053 
Likelihood Ratio 9.453 4 .051 .057
b
 .051 .063 
Fisher's Exact Test 9.504   .051
b
 .045 .056 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.166
c
 1 .075 .081
b
 .074 .088 
N of Valid Cases 495       
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.10. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 762367465. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.779. 
Manager by CSS1. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
reacting quickly to solve the problem when advised of safety hazards. Participants were 
asked to rate the level of importance to react quickly when advised of safety hazards, 
with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and 
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=479) = 
19.37, p<.001. 
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Figure 29. Manager by CSS1. 
Table 9 
Manager by CSS1 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval S
i
g
. 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.009
a
 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 19.027 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
Fisher's Exact Test 19.367   .000
b
 .000 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
16.055
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 479      
a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1388918686. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.007. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and the reacting quickly when advised of safety hazards. The 
Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As 
such, managers were more likely to rate reacting quickly to safety hazards as essential 
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(53.7.9%), compared to workers (35.1%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view 
reacting quickly as high priority (44.3%) when compared to managers (35.7%). The 
graph above depicts this relationship. 
Manager by CSS2. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
insistence on thorough regular safety audits and inspections. Participants were asked to 
rate the level of importance of regular safety audits and inspections with answers ranging 
from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The 
relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=479) = 17.75, p=.001. 
 
Figure 30. Manager by CSS2. 
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Table 10 
Manager by CSS2 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.612
a
 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 17.768 4 .001 .002
b
 .001 .003 
Fisher's Exact Test 17.751   .001
b
 .000 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.226
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 479      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.32. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -3.902. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and insistence on thorough regular safety audits and inspections. The 
Cramer’s V was .19, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such, 
managers were more likely to rate thorough regular safety audits and inspections as 
essential (38.8%), compared to workers (23.2%). Conversely, workers were more likely 
to view safety audits and inspections as a high priority (49.7%) when compared to 
managers (44.6%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS3. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
working to continually improve safety levels in all departments. Participants were asked 
to rate the level of importance of continuing to improve safety levels in all departments 
with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and 
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=478) = 
26.02, p<.001. 
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Figure 31. Manager by CSS3. 
Table 11 
Manager by CSS3 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.612
a
 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 17.768 4 .001 .002
b
 .001 .003 
Fisher's Exact Test 17.751   .001
b
 .000 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
15.226
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 479      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.32. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -3.902. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and working to continually improve safety levels in all departments. 
The Cramer’s V was .23, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. 
As such, managers were more likely to rate working to continually improve safety levels 
as essential (42.9%), compared to workers (32.61%) and as a high priority (45.6%) 
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compared to workers (41.85%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view working 
to continually improve safety levels as a medium priority (16.3%) when compared to 
managers (10.2%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS4. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
providing all the equipment necessary to do the job safely. Participants were asked to rate 
the level of importance of providing necessary equipment with answers ranging from not 
a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship 
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=477) = 24.18, p<.001. 
Figure 32. Manager by CSS4. 
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Table 12 
Manager by CSS4 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.303
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 24.271 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 24.182   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
21.388
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 477      
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.55. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.625. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and providing all the equipment necessary to do the job safely. The 
Cramer’s V was .23, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As 
such, managers were more likely to rate providing all the necessary equipment as 
essential (64.4%), compared to workers (43.2%). Conversely, workers were more likely 
to view providing all the necessary equipment as a high priority (41.1%) when compared 
to managers (29.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS5. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
being strict about continuing to work safely when work falls behind schedule. 
Participants were asked to rate the importance of being strict about continuing to work 
safely with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high 
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, 
N=479) = 20.92, p<.001. 
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Figure 33. Manager by CSS5. 
Table 13 
Manager by CSS5 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.918
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 21.336 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 20.922   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
20.253
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 479      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and being strict about continuing to work safely when work falls 
behind schedule. The Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the 
two variables. As such, managers were more likely to rate being strict about continuing to 
work safely as essential (51.4%), compared to workers (32.4%). Conversely, workers 
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were more likely to view being strict about continuing to work safely as a high priority 
(46.5%) when compared to managers (38.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS6. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
quickly correcting any safety hazard despite cost. Participants were asked to rate the level 
of importance of quickly correcting any safety hazard with answers ranging from not a 
priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship 
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=479) = 20.36, p<.001. 
 
Figure 34. Manager by CSS6. 
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Table 14 
Manager by CSS6 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.883
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 21.819 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 20.357   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
20.160
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 479      
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.16. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.490. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and quickly correcting any safety hazard despite cost. The 
Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As 
such, managers were more likely to rate quickly responding to safety hazard as essential 
(56.8%), compared to workers (38.9%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view 
quickly responding to safety hazard a high priority (40.5%) when compared to managers 
(33.3%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS7. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
providing detailed safety reports to workers. Participants were asked to rate the level of 
importance of providing detailed safety reports with answers ranging from not a priority, 
low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship between these 
variables was significant,  2(4, N=477) = 16.65, p=.002. 
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Figure 35. Manager by CSS7.  
Table 15 
Manager by CSS7 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.534
a
 4 .002 .002
b
 .001 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 16.607 4 .002 .003
b
 .002 .004 
Fisher's Exact Test 16.649   .002
b
 .001 .003 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
10.676
c
 1 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
N of Valid Cases 477      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.10. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -3.267. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and providing detailed safety reports to workers. The Cramer’s V was 
.19, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As such, managers were 
more likely to rate providing detailed safety reports to workers as essential (44.2%), 
compared to workers (28.1%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view providing 
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detailed safety reports as a high priority (43.8%) when compared to managers (34.3%). 
The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS8. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
considering a worker’s safety behavior when moving or promoting people. Participants 
were asked to rate the level of importance of considering a worker’s safety behavior with 
answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and 
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=478) = 
22.65, p<.001. 
 
Figure 36. Manager by CSS8 
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Table 16 
Manager by CSS8 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.970
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 23.728 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 22.652   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
21.022
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 478      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.585. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and considering a worker’s safety behaviors when moving or 
promoting people. The Cramer’s V was .22, suggesting a moderate association between 
the two variables. As such, managers were more likely to rate considering a worker’s 
safety behavior as essential (53.2%), compared to workers (33.5%). Conversely, workers 
were more likely to view considering a worker’s safety behavior as a high priority 
(40.0%) when compared to managers (33.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS9. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
requiring each manager to help improve safety in his/her department. Participants were 
asked to rate the level of importance of requiring each manager to help improve safety in 
his/her department with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium 
priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was 
significant,  2(4, N=478) = 29.76, p<.001. 
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Figure 37. Manager by CSS9. 
Table 17 
Manager by CSS9 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 29.860
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 31.332 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 29.764   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 25.649
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 478      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.16. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -5.064. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and providing all the equipment necessary to do the job safely. The 
Cramer’s V was .25, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As 
such, managers were more likely to rate requiring each manager to help improve safety in 
his/her department as essential (45.7%), compared to workers (24.3%). Conversely, 
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workers were more likely to view requiring each manager to help improve safety as a 
high priority (49.19%) when compared to managers (41.3%) or as a medium priority 
(21.1%) when compared to workers (10.2%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS10. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
investing a lot of time and money in safety training for workers. Participants were asked 
to rate the level of importance of investing a lot of time and money in safety training with 
answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and 
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=475) = 
22.02, p<.001. 
 
Figure 38. Manager by CSS10. 
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Table 18 
Manager by CSS10 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.003
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 22.059 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .001 
Fisher's Exact Test 22.020   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
19.412
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 475      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.91. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.406. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and investing a lot of time and money in safety training for workers. 
The Cramer’s V was .22, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. 
As such, managers were more likely to rate investing a lot of time and money in safety 
training as essential (39.8%), compared to workers (23.2%). Conversely, workers were 
more likely to view investing a lot of time and money in safety training as a high priority 
(43.1%) when compared to managers (39.1%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS11. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
using any available information to improve existing safety rules. Participants were asked 
to rate the level of importance of using any available information to improve existing 
safety rules with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high 
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, 
N=478) = 18.47, p=.001. 
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Figure 39. Manager by CSS11. 
Table 19 
Manager by CSS11 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.515
a
 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 18.751 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
Fisher's Exact Test 18.471   .001
b
 .000 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
16.640
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and using any available information to improve existing safety rules. 
The Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. 
As such, managers were more likely to rate using any available information to improve 
existing safety rules as essential (40.6%), compared to workers (24.3%). Conversely, 
workers were more likely to view using any information to improve safety rules a high 
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priority (48.1%) when compared to managers (41.6%). The graph above depicts this 
relationship.  
Manager by CSS12. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
listening carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety. Participants were asked to 
rate the level of importance of listening to workers’ ideas about improving safety with 
answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and 
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=478) = 
20.66, p<.001. 
 
Figure 40. Manager by CSS12. 
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Table 20 
Manager by CSS12 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.971
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 21.825 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 20.664   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
19.953
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 478      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.467. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and the listening carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety. 
The Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. 
As such, managers were more likely to rate listening to workers as essential (42.7%), 
compared to workers (25.4%). Conversely, workers were more likely to view listening to 
workers a high priority (46.5%) when compared to managers (41.3%). The graph above 
depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS13.  A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
considering safety when setting production speed and schedules. Participants were asked 
to rate the level of importance of considering safety when setting production speed and 
schedules with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high 
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, 
N=476) = 14.39, p=.003. 
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Figure 41. Manager by CSS13.   
Table 21 
Manager by CSS13 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.340
a
 4 .006 .004
b
 .002 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 14.423 4 .006 .007
b
 .005 .009 
Fisher's Exact Test 14.385   .003
b
 .002 .005 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.366
c
 1 .002 .002
b
 .001 .003 
N of Valid Cases 476      
a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.54. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -3.060. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and considering safety when setting production speed and schedules. 
The Cramer’s V was .17, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. As 
such, managers were more likely to rate considering safety when setting production speed 
and schedules as essential (50.2%), compared to workers (33.9%). Conversely, workers 
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were more likely to view considering safety when setting production speed and schedules 
as a high priority (46.5%) when compared to managers (36.2%). The graph above depicts 
this relationship.  
Manager by CSS14.  A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
providing workers with a lot of information on safety issues. Participants were asked to 
rate the level of importance of providing workers with a lot of information on safety 
issues with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high 
priority, and essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, 
N=475) = 20.77, p<.001. 
 
Figure 42. Manager by CSS14.   
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Table 22 
Manager by CSS14 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.830
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 20.675 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .001 
Fisher's Exact Test 20.766   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
19.730
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 475      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.94. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.442. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and the providing workers with a lot of information on safety issues. 
The Cramer’s V was .21, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. 
As such, managers were more likely to rate providing workers with a lot of information 
as essential (51.6%), compared to workers (34.2%). Conversely, workers were slightly 
more likely to view providing a lot of information as a high priority (37.0%) when 
compared to managers (34.7%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
Manager by CSS15.  A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
regularly holding safety-awareness events. Participants were asked to rate the level of 
importance of regularly holding safety-awareness events with answers ranging from not a 
priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and essential. The relationship 
between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=475) = 19.45, p=.001. 
149 
 
 
Figure 43. Manager by CSS15.   
Table 23 
Manager by CSS15 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.480
a
 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 19.550 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
Fisher's Exact Test 19.452   .001
b
 .000 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
17.492
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and regularly holding safety-awareness events. The Cramer’s V was 
.20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As such, managers 
were more likely to rate regularly holding safety-awareness events as essential (39.4%), 
compared to workers (23.5%). Conversely, workers were slightly more likely to view 
regularly holding safety-awareness events as a high priority (38.3%) when compared to 
managers (34.6%). The graph above depicts this relationship.  
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Manager by CSS16.  A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between management status (manager versus worker) and 
giving safety personnel the power they need to do their job. Participants were asked to 
rate the level of importance of giving safety personnel the power they need to do their job 
with answers ranging from not a priority, low priority, medium priority, high priority, and 
essential. The relationship between these variables was significant,  2(4, N=477) = 
19.01, p<.001. 
 
Figure 44. Manager by CSS16.   
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Table 24 
Manager by CSS16 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.251
a
 4 .001 .000
b
 .000 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 18.947 4 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
Fisher's Exact Test 19.006   .000
b
 .000 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
16.904
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 477      
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.55. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1675645214. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.111. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
managerial status and giving safety personnel the power they need to do their job. The 
Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate association between the two variables. As 
such, managers were more likely to rate giving safety personnel the power they need to 
do their job as essential (49.0%), compared to workers (35.1%). Conversely, workers 
were equally as likely to view giving safety personnel power they need to do their job as 
a high priority (40.0%) when compared to managers (40.1%). The graph above depicts 
this relationship.  
Leadership Styles on Climate and Culture of Safety 
Leadership styles by importance of construction contract. A Chi-square test of 
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership 
(autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and the importance of construction 
contract. Participants were asked to rate the importance of the construction contract with 
answers ranging from not very important, not important, neither, important, and very 
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important. The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(4, N=495) = 
17.22, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Figure 45. Leadership Styles by Importance of Construction Contract 
Table 25 
Leadership Styles by Importance of Construction Contract 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.216
a
 8 .028 .031
b
 .027 .036 
Likelihood Ratio 16.569 8 .035 .044
b
 .039 .049 
Fisher's Exact Test 18.123   .009
b
 .007 .012 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.666
c
 1 .103 .114
b
 .105 .122 
N of Valid Cases 495      
a. 8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .73. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.633. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the importance of the construction contract. The Cramer’s V was 
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.13, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. While a majority of 
managers consider the construction contract as “very important”, autocratic leadership 
scored the highest (71.9%), compared to participatory (66.8%) and free rein leaders 
(53.3%). Conversely, the trend is opposite with regard to the category of “importance” 
with free rein leaders ranked the highest at 35%, compared to participatory (30%) and 
autocratic (21.9%) leaders.  
Leadership styles by levels of education. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and 
free rein) styles and educational level. Participants were asked to rank their educational 
level with answers including: did not complete high school, high school/GED, some 
college, bachelor degree, Master’s degree, and advanced graduate work or PhD level. The 
relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(10, N=497) = 23.63, p<.05. The 
null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Figure 46. Leadership Styles by Levels of Education 
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Table 26 
Leadership Styles by Levels of Education 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.627
a
 10 .009 .010
b
 .007 .012 
Likelihood Ratio 24.765 10 .006 .008
b
 .006 .010 
Fisher's Exact Test 23.193   .006
b
 .004 .008 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.692
c
 1 .055 .060
b
 .054 .066 
N of Valid Cases 497      
a. 4 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.23. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.921. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and educational level. The Cramer’s V was .15, suggesting a weak 
association between the two variables. Compared to its cohorts, free rein leaders are more 
likely to report some college (44.26%), autocratic leaders Master’s degree (14.84%), and 
participatory leaders bachelor’s degree (28.57%). It is interesting to note that a majority 
of respondents reported having attained some high school/GED or some college degrees. 
For instance, 44.26% of free rein leaders reported having attained some college degree 
while 32.79% reported attaining high school/GED degrees.  
Leadership styles by leadership program. A Chi-square test of independence 
was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, 
and free rein) styles and whether or not the subjects participated in a leadership program. 
The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(2, N=495) = 7.09, p<.05. The 
null hypothesis is rejected.  
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Figure 47.Leadership Styles by Leadership Program 
Table 27 
Leadership Styles by Leadership Program 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.089
a
 2 .029 .031
b
 .027 .035 
Likelihood Ratio 7.137 2 .028 .030
b
 .026 .035 
Fisher's Exact Test 7.061   .031
b
 .027 .035 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.852
c
 1 .016 .019
b
 .016 .023 
N of Valid Cases 495      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 29.81. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784. 
c. The standardized statistic is 2.419. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and whether participants had taken a leadership program. The Cramer’s 
V was .12, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. It is interesting to 
note that leaders differ in regard to taking leadership styles; autocratic leaders were more 
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likely to say “yes” to taking a leadership style (57.5%) when compared to participatory 
(52.6%) and free rein leaders (37.1%). Conversely, free rein leaders were more likely to 
say “no” to taking a leadership style (62.9%), compared to participatory (47.4%) and 
autocratic leaders (42.5%).  
Leadership styles by implementation of successful safety program. A Chi-
square test of independence was calculated to determine the relationship between 
leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and participant’s perception of 
whether their organization has implemented a successful safety program. Respondents 
had options ranging from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or disagree”, 
“agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was significant, 
χ2(2, N=495) = 7.09, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Figure 48. Leadership styles by implementation of successful safety program 
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Table 28 
Leadership Styles by Implementation of a Successful Safety Program 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.679
a
 8 .008 .009
b
 .006 .011 
Likelihood Ratio 19.399 8 .013 .016
b
 .012 .019 
Fisher's Exact Test 19.715   .008
b
 .006 .010 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.694
c
 1 .017 .017
b
 .014 .020 
N of Valid Cases 499      
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.86. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.386. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and implementation of a successful safety program. The Cramer’s V was 
.14, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic leaders (66.4%) 
and participatory leaders (69.6%) were more likely to “agree” when compared to free rein 
leaders (53.23%). Furthermore, autocratic leaders (18.75%) were more likely to “strongly 
agree” with the statement, compared to participatory leaders (13.59%) and free rein 
leaders (14.52%) 
Leadership styles by strong commitment to safety. A Chi-square test of 
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership 
(autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and commitment to safety. Respondents 
were asked whether they believed that their top managers had a strong commitment to 
safety; the choices were: “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or disagree”, 
“agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was significant, 
χ2(8, N=496) = 27.32, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Figure 49. Leadership styles by strong commitment to safety 
Table 28 
Leadership Styles by Strong Commitment to Safety 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 27.323
a
 8 .001 .001
b
 .000 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 25.444 8 .001 .003
b
 .001 .004 
Fisher's Exact Test 24.654   .002
b
 .001 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
15.084
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .001 
N of Valid Cases 496      
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.38. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784. 
c. The standardized statistic is -3.884. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and strong commitment to safety by top managers. The Cramer’s V was 
.16, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic leaders (61.1%) 
and participatory leaders (64.0%) were more likely to “agree” when compared to free rein 
leaders (50.0%). Furthermore, autocratic leaders (25.4%) were more likely to “strongly 
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agree” with the statement, compared to participatory leaders (17.5%) and free rein leaders 
(12.9%). 
Leadership styles by direct manager prioritizing safety. A Chi-square test of 
independence was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership 
(autocratic, participatory, and free rein) styles and direct manager prioritizing safety. 
Respondents were asked whether they believed that their direct managers prioritize 
safety; the choices ranged from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or 
disagree”, “agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was 
significant, χ2(8, N=498) = 34.60, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 50. Leadership styles by direct manager prioritizing safety 
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Table 29 
Leadership Styles by Direct Manager Prioritizing Safety 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 34.604
a
 8 .000 .000
b
 .000 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 32.325 8 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 32.114   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.877
c
 1 .009 .010
b
 .007 .012 
N of Valid Cases 498      
a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.74. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.622. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and direct manager prioritizing safety on a daily basis. The Cramer’s V 
was .18, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic leaders 
(53.42%) and participatory leaders (66.340%) were more likely to “agree” when 
compared to free rein leaders (43.0%). Furthermore, autocratic leaders (22.81%) were 
more likely to “strongly agree” with the statement, compared to participatory leaders 
(13.27%) and free rein leaders (12.9%). Thus, when it comes to direct manager 
prioritizing safety, participatory leaders are more likely to “agree”, autocratic leaders 
“strongly agree”, and free rein “neither agree or disagree.” 
Leadership styles by feeling safe. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and 
free rein) styles and feeling safe. Respondents were asked whether they believed that they 
feel safe; the choices ranged from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree or 
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disagree”, “agree”, or “strongly agree.” The relationship between these variables was 
significant, χ2(8, N=497) = 17.21, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 51. Leadership Styles by Feeling Safe 
Table 30 
Leadership Styles by Feeling Safety 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.200
a
 8 .028 .026
b
 .021 .030 
Likelihood Ratio 15.367 8 .052 .071
b
 .064 .077 
Fisher's Exact Test 16.042   .029
b
 .024 .033 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.248
c
 1 .072 .073
b
 .066 .079 
N of Valid Cases 497      
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.81. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1304558784. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.802. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and feeling safe. The Cramer’s V was .13, suggesting a weak association 
between the two variables. Autocratic leaders (63.28%) and participatory leaders 
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(71.84%) were more likely to “agree” when compared to free rein leaders (61.67%). 
Furthermore, autocratic leaders (23.44%) were more likely to “strongly agree” with the 
statement, compared to participatory leaders (18.12%) and free rein leaders (16.67%). 
Thus, when it comes to direct manager prioritizing safety, participatory leaders are more 
likely to “agree”, autocratic leaders “strongly agree”, and free rein “neither agree or 
disagree.” 
Leadership styles by organizational size. A Chi-square test of independence 
was calculated to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, 
and free rein) styles and organizational size. Choices for organizational size ranged from 
1-50, 51-250, 251-500, 501-1,000, and 1,000+. The relationship between these variables 
was significant, χ2(8, N=499) = 18.65, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 52. Leadership styles by organizational size 
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Table 31 
Leadership Styles by Organizational Size 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.659
a
 8 .017 .018
b
 .014 .021 
Likelihood Ratio 18.803 8 .016 .021
b
 .017 .024 
Fisher's Exact Test 17.838   .021
b
 .017 .024 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.331
c
 1 .037 .036
b
 .031 .041 
N of Valid Cases 499      
a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.98. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 23202691. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.081. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and organizational size. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak 
association between the two variables. While a majority of the participants belonged to 
organizations between 1-50 workers, free rein leaders particularly had the highest 
concentration at 69.4%, followed by autocratic leaders at 48.4%, and participatory 
leaders at 43.4%. Compared to free rein and autocratic leaders, participatory leaders were 
more present with larger organizations: 27.8% for 51-250 size and 16.5% for 201-500 
size. This is also the case for autocratic leaders.  
Leadership styles by CSS1. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to how quickly the organization solves 
the problem when advised of safety hazards. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low 
priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between 
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these variables was not significant, χ2(8, N=485) = 13.73, p>.05. The null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
Leadership styles by CSS2. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to insisting on thorough regular safety 
audits and inspection. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium 
priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was 
not significant, χ2(8, N=485) = 13.74, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
 
Figure 53. Leadership Styles by CSS2 
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Table 32 
Leadership Styles by CSS2 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.463
a
 8 .026 .029
b
 .024 .033 
Likelihood Ratio 16.108 8 .041 .053
b
 .047 .059 
Fisher's Exact Test 17.131   .023
b
 .019 .026 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.357
c
 1 .007 .008
b
 .006 .010 
N of Valid Cases 485      
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .74. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.712. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to insisting on thorough 
regular safety audits and inspection. The Cramer’s V was .10, suggesting a weak 
association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more 
likely to view regular safety audits and inspections as “essential” and “high priority” 
while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and were more likely to 
consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were evenly split between 
viewing CSS2 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and “essential.”  
Leadership styles by CSS3. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to working to continually improve safety 
levels in all departments. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium 
priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was 
not significant, χ2(8, N=484) = 9.86, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
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Leadership styles by CSS4. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to providing all of the equipment 
necessarily to do the job well. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was not significant, χ2(8, N=483) = 14.85, p>.05. The null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
Leadership styles by CSS5. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to being strict about continuing to work 
safely when work falls behind schedule. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low 
priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between 
these variables was significant, χ2(8, N=485) = 23.48, p<.05. The null hypothesis is 
rejected.  
 
Figure 54. Leadership styles by CSS5 
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Table 33 
Leadership styles by CSS5 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.484
a
 8 .003 .005
b
 .003 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 18.696 8 .017 .014
b
 .011 .017 
Fisher's Exact Test 19.646   .007
b
 .005 .010 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.578
c
 1 .108 .115
b
 .107 .124 
N of Valid Cases 485      
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.606. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to being strict about 
continuing to work safely when work falls behind schedule. The Cramer’s V was .16, 
suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory 
leaders were more likely to view regular safety audits and inspections as “essential” and 
“high priority” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and were 
more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were evenly 
split between viewing CSS5 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and “essential.”  
Leadership styles by CSS6. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to quickly correcting any safety hazard 
(even if costly). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, 
“high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not 
significant, χ2(8, N=485) = 14.41, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
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Leadership styles by CSS7. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to providing detailed safety reports to 
workers (e.g. injuries, near accidents). Choices were “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=483) = 16.77, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 55.Leadership styles by CSS7 
Table 34 
Leadership Styles by CSS7 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.766
a
 8 .033 .035
b
 .031 .040 
Likelihood Ratio 14.140 8 .078 .094
b
 .086 .101 
Fisher's Exact Test 14.525   .057
b
 .051 .063 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.716
c
 1 .001 .002
b
 .001 .003 
N of Valid Cases 483      
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.12. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -3.274. 
169 
 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to being strict about 
continuing to work safely when work falls behind schedule. The Cramer’s V was .16, 
suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory 
leaders were more likely to view regular safety audits and inspections as “essential” and 
“high priority” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and were 
more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were evenly 
split between viewing CSS7 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and “essential.”  
Leadership styles by CSS8. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to considering a worker’s safety behavior 
when moving-promoting people. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=499) = 18.66, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 56. Leadership styles by CSS8 
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Table 35 
Leadership Styles by CSS8 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.513
a
 8 .012 .016
b
 .013 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 14.394 8 .072 .080
b
 .073 .087 
Fisher's Exact Test 14.503   .050
b
 .044 .056 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.269
c
 1 .012 .013
b
 .010 .016 
N of Valid Cases 484      
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.504. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to considering a worker’s 
safety behavior when moving-promoting people. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a 
weak association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were 
more likely to consider a worker’s safety behavior when moving-promoting people as 
“essential” and “high priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their 
counterparts and were more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein 
leaders were evenly split between viewing CSS8 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” 
and “essential.”  
Leadership styles by CSS9. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated to 
determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to requiring each manager to help 
improve safety in his/her department. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low 
priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between 
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these variables was significant, χ2(8, N=483) = 23.68, p<.05. The null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
 
Figure 57. Leadership Styles by CSS9 
Table 36 
Leadership Styles by CSS9 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.681
a
 8 .003 .004
b
 .003 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 18.551 8 .017 .021
b
 .017 .024 
Fisher's Exact Test 19.911   .009
b
 .006 .011 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.437
c
 1 .006 .007
b
 .005 .009 
N of Valid Cases 483      
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.727. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey relating to requiring each manager to 
help improve safety in his/her department. The Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak 
association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more 
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likely to consider a manager to help improve safety in his/her department as “essential” 
and “high priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their counterparts and 
were more likely to consider it as “medium priority.” That is, free rein leaders were 
evenly split between viewing CSS8 as “medium priority,” “high priority,” and 
“essential.”  
Leadership styles by CSS10. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to investing a lot of time and money in 
safety training for workers. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”,  
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=481) = 24.01, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 58.Leadership styles by CSS10 
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Table 37 
Leadership Styles by CSS10 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.010
a
 8 .002 .003
b
 .002 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 20.426 8 .009 .012
b
 .009 .015 
Fisher's Exact Test 19.515   .009
b
 .007 .012 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
8.608
c
 1 .003 .004
b
 .002 .005 
N of Valid Cases 481      
a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .75. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.934. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to investing a lot of time and money in 
safety training for workers. The Cramer’s V was .16, suggesting a weak association 
between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more likely to 
consider investing a lot of time and money in safety training as “essential”, “high 
priority”, and “medium priority” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their 
counterparts and were more likely to consider it as “medium priority” and “low priority.”  
Leadership styles by CSS11. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to using any available information to 
improve existing safety rules. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was not significant, χ2(8, N=484) = 13.21, p>.05. The null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
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Leadership styles by CSS12. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to listening carefully to worker’s ideas 
about improving safety. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium 
priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was 
not significant, χ2(8, N=484) = 13.21, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
Leadership styles by CSS13. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to considering safety when setting 
production speed and schedules. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=482) = 26.75, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 59. Leadership Styles by CSS13 
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Table 38 
Leadership Styles by CSS13 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.749
a
 8 .001 .002
b
 .001 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 19.092 8 .014 .018
b
 .015 .022 
Fisher's Exact Test 18.751   .011
b
 .008 .014 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.567
c
 1 .018 .020
b
 .016 .023 
N of Valid Cases 482      
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .49. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.360. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting 
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .17, suggesting a weak association 
between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more likely to 
considering safety when setting production speed and schedules as “essential”, “high 
priority”, and “medium priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than their 
counterparts and ranged in “low priority”, “medium priority”, and “low priority.”  
Leadership styles by CSS14. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to providing workers with a lot of 
information on safety issues. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=480) = 42.28, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Figure 60. Leadership styles by CSS14 
Table 39 
Leadership Styles by CSS14 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 42.278
a
 8 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 37.103 8 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 35.166   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.506
c
 1 .011 .013
b
 .010 .016 
N of Valid Cases 480      
a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.551. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting 
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .20, suggesting a moderate 
association between the two variables. Autocratic and participatory leaders were more 
177 
 
likely to considering safety when setting production speed and schedules as “essential”, 
“high priority”, and “medium priority,” while free rein leaders were ranked lower than 
their counterparts and ranged in “low priority”, “medium priority”, and “low priority.”  
Leadership styles by CSS15. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to regularly held safety-awareness events 
(e.g., presentations, ceremonies). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=481) = 15.86, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 61. Leadership styles by CSS15 
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Table 40 
Leadership Styles by CSS15 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.851
a
 8 .045 .044
b
 .039 .049 
Likelihood Ratio 14.245 8 .076 .091
b
 .083 .098 
Fisher's Exact Test 14.834   .055
b
 .049 .061 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.147
c
 1 .042 .045
b
 .040 .050 
N of Valid Cases 481      
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.84. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.036. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting 
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .13, suggesting a weak association 
between the two variables. Autocratic leaders are more likely to view CSS15 as 
“essential” by 39.8% when compared to participatory and free rein at 32.8% and 28.8%, 
respectively. Participatory leaders are more likely to report it as “high priority” at 39.1% 
compared to free rein and autocratic leaders at 30.5% and 29.3%, respectively.   
Leadership styles by CSS16. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between leadership (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) 
styles and the culture of climate survey relating to regularly hold safety-awareness events 
(e.g., presentations, ceremonies). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, to 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(8, N=483) = 16.75, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Figure 62. Leadership styles by CSS16 
Table 41 
Leadership Styles by CSS16 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.751
a
 8 .033 .036
b
 .031 .041 
Likelihood Ratio 14.426 8 .071 .088
b
 .081 .095 
Fisher's Exact Test 15.494   .038
b
 .033 .043 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.125
c
 1 .042 .045
b
 .039 .050 
N of Valid Cases 483      
a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1157648955. 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.031. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between 
leadership styles and the culture of climate survey to considering safety when setting 
production speed and schedules. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak association 
between the two variables. Autocratic leaders are more likely to view CSS16 as 
“essential” at 46.0% when compared to participatory and free rein at 43.0% and 42.4%, 
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respectively. Participatory leaders are more likely to report it as “high priority” at 42.3%, 
compared to free rein and autocratic leaders at 25.4% and 38.7%, respectively.   
Organizational Size by Climate and Culture of Safety 
Organizational size by educational level. A Chi-square test of independence 
was calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size and educational 
level. Participants were asked to rank their educational level with answers including: did 
not complete high school, high school/GED, some college, bachelor’s degree, master’s 
degree, and advanced graduate work or PhD level. The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(20, N=502) = 65.14, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 63. Organizational size by educational level  
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Table 42 
Organizational Size by Educational Level 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 65.138
a
 20 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 67.837 20 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 65.261   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
36.757
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 502      
a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .64. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000. 
c. The standardized statistic is 6.063. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between 
organizational size and educational level. The Cramer’s V was .18, suggesting a weak 
association between the two variables. It is interesting to note that 46.88% of those 
belonging to 1000+ company size reported having some level of college, though slightly 
positively skewed towards bachelor’s degree and above. Those belonging to 1-50 
company size were less educated compared to their counterparts, with a majority 
straddling between high school (35.0%) and some college (38.75%). Those belonging to 
51-250 company size were slightly more educated, with the majority straddling between 
some college (30.33%) and bachelor’s degree (34.43%). It is also interesting to note that 
those with a master’s degree were more likely to belong to 51+ size organizations.  
Organizational size by leadership program. A Chi-square test of independence 
was calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size and whether or 
not the participants took a leadership program. The relationship between these variables 
was significant, χ2(4, N=502) = 36.02, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Figure 64. Organizational Size by Leadership Program 
Table 44 
Organizational Size by Leadership Program 
Chi-Square Tests 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between 
organizational size and whether or not they took a leadership program. The Cramer’s V 
was .27, suggesting a weak association between the two variables. Those belonging to 
501-1000 were more likely to report taking a leadership program (74.29% compared to 
25.71%), followed by 251-500 (67.61% compared to 32.39%), 51-250 (61.16% 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 36.019
a
 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 36.682 4 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 36.199   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
23.595
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 500      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.36. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 334431365. 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.857. 
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compared to 38.84%), and 100+ (59.38% compared to 40.63%). Consequently, those 
who belong to the 1-50 organizational size were less likely to take a leadership program 
with 61.41% reporting “no” compared to the 38.59% “yes.” 
Organizational size by CSS1. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to how quickly the organization solved the problem when advised of 
safety hazards. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, 
“high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not 
significant, χ2(16, N=487) = 14.53, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
Organizational size by CSS2. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to insisting on thorough, regular safety audits and inspections. Choices 
ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and 
“essential.” The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(16, N=487) = 
39.03, p<.001. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 65. Organizational size by CSS2  
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Table 43 
Organizational size by CSS2 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 39.031
a
 16 .001 .003
b
 .002 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 44.261 16 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
Fisher's Exact Test 38.667   .000
b
 .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.560
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .001 
N of Valid Cases 487      
a. 10 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942. 
c. The standardized statistic is 3.945. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between 
organizational size and CSS2. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak association 
between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more likely to view 
CSS2 as essential, while those below 500 were more likely to view it as a “high priority.” 
Thus, larger organizations were more likely to view CSS2 as more essential and high 
priority when compared to its cohorts.  
Organizational size by CSS3. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to working to continually improve safety levels in all departments. 
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, to “medium priority”, “high 
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, 
χ2(16, N=486) = 22.393, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
Organizational size by CSS4. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
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survey relating to working to continually improve safety levels in all departments. 
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, 
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16, 
N=485) = 10.16, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
Organizational size by CSS5. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to being strict about continuing to work safely when work falls behind 
schedule. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high 
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, 
χ2(16, N=485) = 9.137, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
Organizational size by CSS6. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to quickly correcting any safety hazard (even if it is costly). Choices 
ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, and 
“essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16, N=487) = 
9.34, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
Organizational size by CSS7. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to providing detailed safety reports to workers (e.g. injuries, near 
accidents). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, 
“high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not 
significant, χ2(16, N=485) = 15.67, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
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Organizational size by CSS8. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to considering a worker’s safety behavior when moving-promoting 
people. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high 
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, 
χ2(16, N=486) = 12.88, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted. 
Organizational size by CSS9. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture of climate 
survey relating to requiring each manager to help improve safety in his/her department. 
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, 
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(16, N=485) 
= 33.91, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure 66. Organizational size by CSS9  
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Table 44 
Organizational Size by CSS9 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.908
a
 16 .006 .011
b
 .008 .013 
Likelihood Ratio 34.562 16 .005 .004
b
 .003 .006 
Fisher's Exact Test 31.378   .005
b
 .003 .006 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.752
c
 1 .005 .007
b
 .005 .009 
N of Valid Cases 485      
a. 11 cells (44.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .26. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942. 
c. The standardized statistic is 2.784. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between 
organizational size styles and CSS9. The Cramer’s V was .13 suggesting a very weak 
association between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more 
likely to view CSS9 as “essential” while those below 500 were more likely to view it as a 
“high priority.”  
Organizational size by CSS10. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture 
of climate survey relating to investing a lot of time and money in safety training for 
workers. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high 
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was significant, χ2(16, 
N=483) = 35.82, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
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Figure 67. Organizational size by CSS10  
Table 45 
Organizational size by CSS10 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.821
a
 16 .003 .006
b
 .004 .008 
Likelihood Ratio 35.242 16 .004 .005
b
 .003 .007 
Fisher's Exact Test 30.064   .009
b
 .006 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
15.440
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 483      
a. 8 cells (32.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942. 
c. The standardized statistic is 3.929. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between 
organizational size styles and CSS10. The Cramer’s V was .14, suggesting a weak 
association between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more 
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likely to view CSS10 as “essential” while those below 500 were more likely to view it as 
a “high priority.”  
Organizational size by CSS11. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture 
of climate survey relating to using any available information to improve existing safety 
rules. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high 
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, 
χ2(16, N=486) = 24.63, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.  
Organizational size by CSS12. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture 
of climate survey relating to listening carefully to worker’s ideas about improving safety. 
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, 
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16, 
N=486) = 13.28, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.  
Organizational size by CSS13. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture 
of climate survey relating to considering safety when setting production speed and 
schedule. Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high 
priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, 
χ2(16, N=484) = 18.50, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.  
Organizational size by CSS14. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture 
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of climate survey relating to providing workers with a lot of information on safety issues. 
Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, “medium priority”, “high priority”, 
and “essential.” The relationship between these variables was not significant, χ2(16, 
N=482) = 10.58, p>.05. The null hypothesis is accepted.  
Organizational size by CSS15. A Chi-square test of independence was 
calculated to determine the relationship between organizational size styles and the culture 
of climate survey relating to regularly holding safety-awareness events (e.g., 
presentations, ceremonies). Choices ranged from “not a priority,” “low priority”, 
“medium priority”, “high priority”, and “essential.” The relationship between these 
variables was significant, χ2(16, N=483) = 28.77, p<.05. The null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Figure 68. Organizational size by CSS15 
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Table 46 
Organizational Size by CSS15 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.821
a
 16 .003 .006
b
 .004 .008 
Likelihood Ratio 35.242 16 .004 .005
b
 .003 .007 
Fisher's Exact Test 30.064   .009
b
 .006 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
15.440
c
 1 .000 .000
b
 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 483      
a. 8 cells (32.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1801792942. 
c. The standardized statistic is 3.929. 
A post hoc analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between 
organizational size styles and CSS15. The Cramer’s V was .12, suggesting a weak 
association between the two variables. Those belonging 500+ organization were more 
likely to view CSS15 as “essential” while those below 500 were more likely to view it as 
a “high priority” or “medium priority.”    
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
While the study of safety within the construction industry has spanned over the 
last three decades, the emphasis of safety as a systemic issue is a relatively new concept, 
as is the need for full recognition by the construction industry of the powerful role it 
plays as a key stakeholder in the systemic organizational interplay between the industry 
and individual organizations regarding safety.  Yet, the understanding of a need to protect 
the worker is a topic with a robust history, including discussion, research, and debate 
with roots in a struggle for the recognition that the labor force has a right not only to fair 
wages, but also a safe work environment. This realization has been addressed in the fields 
of politics and economics as well as the social sciences, but it has rarely addressed the 
fact that the construction industry is in conflict with itself. The construction industry 
neglects to effectively explore the multiplicity within the etiology of conflict—that of 
the industry, the individual job site, the worker, and the manager—and the perception 
of safety at the macro-level, the mezzo-level entities, and finally the micro-level 
through specific work tasks.  It is the cornerstone of not only understanding the 
conflict, but of moving from awareness and comprehension to action and solutions 
that are best explored through systems theory and the utilization of the Marxist 
theory.   
The study also rendered insight into better addressing the needs of small 
construction companies that account for the largest portion of the industry. While 
they may lack the resources of larger companies, because of their ability to 
disseminate information and initiate organizational change more quickly as a result 
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of their size, smaller companies may be in the position to implement more proactive 
rather than reactive approaches to worker safety. 
Purpose 
Despite the creation of OSHA more than 30 years ago, the construction 
industry has yet to effectively integrate a large-scale, sustainable, and replicable 
model of construction safety initiated of and by the industry demanding the 
emergence of forums that facilitate necessary discussions to ensure that management 
does more than address safety at the macro-level (i.e., culture of safety). This 
research argued that both managers and workers already put a high priority on safety. 
Yet this does not seem to be enough, as the Construction Industry of and to itself has 
been unable to effectively offer integrated solutions that would support a shift from 
placing the blame on the worker to recognizing the true systemic nature of both the 
industry and the activities it engenders at the construction job site.  Furthermore, it 
argued for the need to reevaluate at all levels of construction safety regarding policy 
construct, the design, and the decision-making processes of those who rank highest in 
the system hierarchy.  
The purpose of this research was to explore the perception of climate of safety 
among construction managers and workers and also to determine if there was a 
relationship between the perception of safety and the three distinct leadership styles – 
authoritarian, participatory, and free rein.  Additionally, this study endeavored to find if 
certain demographics within the construction industry had any statistical relevance 
regarding the aforementioned areas of investigation. Specifically, the characteristics of 
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age, gender, geographic location of the worker and/or manager, level of education, union 
affiliation, and company size were utilized in an effort to further extrapolate any 
interdependence between groups and variables.   
This study was also interested in the macro-level conflict within the construction 
industry, as this industry has continued to lead a very public call to action for job 
site/worker safety. While construction safety has been the driving force behind all 
projects, the levels of severe and fatal injuries across the continuum of the construction 
field have surpassed all other industries. This issue is crucial to the industry as it is 
inherently hazardous; as such, safety and the exposure of the worker to unsafe conditions, 
unsafe acts, or a combination of both must be addressed.  
Key Findings from Study  
This study explored the different factors contributing to how safety is experienced 
and perceived within construction organizations.  It considered how managers and 
workers regard safety, how the varying types of leadership style may perceive these 
concerns differently, and finally how the size of the organization may influence the 
prioritization of safety.   
Managers and workers with regard to safety concerns 
The first research question sought to explore the relationship between managerial 
status and the perception of safety concerns. Specifically, it was concerned with the issue 
of whether workers and managers were aligned with regard to safety concerns. While 
most managers and workers were relatively similar in their level of agreement that safety 
is of high importance in the work environment, there were several differences worth 
195 
 
noting. First, although both managers and workers view the construction contract in 
general, and regard safety specifically as important, managers tended to rate it at a higher 
level of priority. Managers were also slightly more likely to report that their organization 
had implemented successful safety programs and to endorse the idea that their top 
managers have a strong commitment to safety. Compared to workers, managers were 
more likely to emphasize the importance of helping to improve their safety department 
and affording safety personnel the power they needed to do their job. Despite these 
differences, having access to the necessary safety equipment was generally considered to 
be a high priority despite managerial status or leadership styles.   
Although workers viewed enforcing regular safety audits and inspections as a 
priority, managers were more likely to view this as essential for the work environment. 
Managers were also slightly more likely to promote investing time and money in safety 
training, providing workers with information on safety issues, and holding safety-
awareness events. Managers also tended to prioritize quick responses to safety hazards, 
continuing to work safely, and considering safety when setting production speed and 
schedules beyond workers. Furthermore, managers were more likely to put a higher 
importance on listening to workers’ concerns and continuing to improve safety levels 
regardless of leadership styles. Providing detailed safety reports and considering workers’ 
safety behavior when considering promotions was generally perceived to be a high 
priority across both managerial positions despite leadership style.  
Overall, while both managers and workers endorsed similar levels of importance 
of the construction contract and safety concerns, managers were slightly more likely to 
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consider their companies as having strong commitments to safety concerns and 
improvements in the workplace. Furthermore, managers were also more concerned with 
implementing safety programs and considering safety when developing the success and 
productivity of their company.  
Leadership styles with regard to safety concerns 
The second research question explored whether different types of leadership 
styles (autocratic, participatory, and free rein) differed in regard to the perception of 
safety. While the majority of managers considered the construction contract and overall 
safety concerns as very important, autocratic leaders tended to report a higher level of 
importance across the different safety concerns and their commitment to safety compared 
to the other leadership styles. This was found to be true because autocratic leaders tend to 
develop in larger organizations where there are greater resources and a greater number of 
codified policies and procedures set forth by macro-level management. Autocratic leaders 
were more likely to perceive their construction site as safe when compared to free rein or 
participatory leaders. Furthermore, they emphasized the importance of providing detailed 
safety reports to workers (injuries, near accidents, etc.) above participatory and even 
more so than those who adopted a free rein leadership style.   
Although participatory leaders were more likely to consider safety a high priority 
when compared to free rein leaders, autocratic leaders were more likely to place the 
highest level of importance and commitment across all safety concerns. Autocratic and 
participatory leaders tended to perceive their organizations as having implemented a 
successful safety program and their top managers as having a strong commitment to 
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prioritizing safety. They were also much more likely than free rein leaders to prioritize 
the need to provide safety personnel the power to do their job, endorse regular safety 
audits and inspections, and continue to work safely when work falls behind schedule.  
Consequently, free rein leaders were less concerned about a worker’s safety behavior 
when considering promotion or providing workers with information on safety issues 
compared to the other two leadership styles. Autocratic leaders, followed by participatory 
leaders, tended to place a greater emphasis on regular safety-awareness events compared 
to free rein leaders.  
The majority of managers across leadership styles tended to place a high level of 
importance on correcting any safety hazard despite the cost. However, autocratic and 
participatory leaders were more likely to not only endorse investment of time and money 
in safety training, but also consider safety when setting production speed and schedules 
compared to free rein leaders, who were less likely to report this aspect as an important 
aspect in the work place.  
These results suggested that autocratic leaders tended to perceive safety concerns 
in general with the highest priority, while participatory leaders followed closely behind.  
Individuals that identified with a free rein leadership style were less likely to rate these 
concerns as high priorities. Furthermore, autocratic and participatory leaders tended to be 
more interested in maintaining and correcting safety concerns in the work environment 
despite the cost. Consequently, they were more likely to belong to larger organizations, 
and larger organizations may have more resources to invest. Taking into consideration 
organizational size, larger organizations were more likely to view investment in safety 
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concerns as a higher priority when compared to smaller companies, despite managerial 
status or leadership style. In essence, larger corporations were more likely to invest in the 
maintenance and correction of safety in the work place. Furthermore, free rein leaders 
tended to belong to smaller organizations of 1-50 workers, while participatory and 
autocratic were more present within larger organizations.  
Organizational size with regard to safety concerns 
The third main research question sought to determine if organizational size 
impacted the perception of safety. Organizational size did not differ in many aspects of 
safety concerns in the work place. Across all organizational sizes, there was a high level 
of importance and priority placed on improving safety levels and rules, continuing to 
work safely when work falls behind schedule, providing detailed safety reports to 
workers, considering a worker’s safety behavior during promotions, listening to workers 
ideas about improving safety, considering safety when setting production speed and 
schedule, providing workers with information on safety issues, or giving safety personnel 
the power to do their job.  Yet, managers in small companies were more likely to be free 
rein leaders when compared to their mid and large-sized counterparts.  
Managers, specifically autocratic or participatory leaders, were more likely to 
prioritize safety audits and were more likely to belong to larger organizations. Those 
belonging to larger organizations were also more likely to place a higher level of 
importance on requiring each manager to help improve safety in his/her department.  
They were also more likely to prioritize investment in safety training and safety-
awareness events.  
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In essence, the research suggested that larger organizations may place a greater 
emphasis on each manager’s responsibility in creating a safer environment due to the fact 
that they have a larger number of workers to maintain. They were also more likely to 
have resources to invest in safety trainings and programs to ensure their commitment to 
creating a safe work environment. Consequently, larger organizations were more likely to 
have autocratic leaders, who, by nature, are concerned with following the rules and 
regulations.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
This research explored the perception of safety climate on the construction jobsite 
by both workers and managers. It also examined how the perception of safety climate 
could be impacted by different leadership styles and how these findings could bring the 
construction industry from one that is in conflict with itself to one that is focused on 
understanding possible alternative ways to approach safety management. This study was 
neither meant to show causation nor be predictive, but rather uncover the true nature of 
why an industry that has a rich tradition of calling for a greater priority to be given to 
measuring safety effectively has repeatedly been unable to do so. Many in the industry 
did not know how to react when OSHA and the BLS reported an increase in 2015 in fatal 
construction injuries, as this seemed counterintuitive to the programs, policies, and 
procedures that had been implemented over the last decade and were meant to keep the 
worker free from unsafe acts, unsafe conditions or a combination of both.    
The reaction was unfortunately silence—or, at best, an inclination to regress into a 
debate about lagging indicators and frequency—rather than severity in an attempt to 
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make sense of what was clearly a flawed system and inadequate resources. To be 
effective, construction safety must emphasize the need for an integrated safety 
management approach involving macro, mezzo, and micro level directives starting at the 
broadest level, the macro, and include policies and procedures such as those found in the 
construction contract and subcontracts. When discussing the macro level constructs, it is 
important to note that these forces are established at the highest level of management as a 
means of creating a clear and concise blueprint upon which all safety decisions are 
implemented, reinforced, and monitored. Furthermore, this approach uses a top-
down/bottom-up approach regarding the dissemination of necessary safety-related issues. 
When managed correctly and responsibly, these initiatives create a strong systemic 
climate of safety that ultimately engenders the necessary and effective information loop 
between management and the worker.  
Jobsite relationships are based on communication. This communication becomes 
the foundation upon which expectations are prioritized, as they first are documented in 
writing, which must include measurable outcomes and leave no room for interpretation 
when communicated to the worker (Parboteeah & Kapp, 2008). Building upon the 
foundation of perception of climate of safety, the construction jobsite and the safety 
issues influenced by leadership styles cannot be seen as resulting from one single safety 
act or omission. More specifically, organizational influences, contracts, subcontracts, 
master agreements, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions or a combination of all, are where the real issue of understanding the problem 
exists. Further, it allows for the potential of solutions to be realized when information is 
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effectively categorized and, in turn, is extrapolated at each level by the inclusion of 
groupings, trends, and relationships that are identified as a means of further recognizing 
both overt and covert systemic failures. 
The construction industry can no longer hide from its own flawed truth, one that 
is highlighted by the reality that while hazardous in nature, it does not need to be unsafe.  
Construction safety management is systemically flawed, and as such, the worker is at risk 
from the moment he/she steps onto the construction jobsite.   
This flawed formula for keeping the worker safe was the impetus for this 
research. Future research must continue with a focus on perception of safety, as 
perception appears to be a key to the actualization of a solution as a deeper 
understanding; it is the only way in which to address this conflict and gain greater insight 
into the extent by which it can be effectively applied to those means and methods that 
drive construction safety management.  As noted, this researcher found both workers and 
managers cognizant of the importance of job site safety, yet even with this awareness, the 
construction industry continues to be one that is both inherently hazardous and 
unnecessarily dangerous.   Practical implementation of more effective safety standards, 
therefore, may be found in discussions regarding perceived safety climate and real-time 
safety measures, as well as looking at the reasons for the disconnect between perception 
of a safe workplace and the reality of above average catastrophic and fatal injuries. As a 
result, it appears prudent that the industry look to the adoption of leadership styles that 
meet the needs of each job site based on the criteria used in this research, rather than a 
one-size fits all approach. 
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Expected Contribution  
This research marks an important contribution to the construction industry, as it 
explored a niche within research that has long been ignored. Despite the inherent hazards 
related to construction work, it would be highly suspect to assume that any worker, given 
the choice and the awareness, would choose to work on a jobsite that is unsafe. This was 
reflected in their responses that show that safety is perceived as important by workers 
across the continuum of the industry. There was little deviation when expressed through 
the lenses of age, gender, geographic location, company size, education, union affiliation, 
and years as members of this specific workforce. 
Given these results, the notion that this is an industry in conflict with itself is not 
simply an idea but a statement of fact.  If the construction industry is genuine in its 
protestations for the need to keep the worker safe, it must recognize itself as not only a 
party of the system, but at the highest level of the systemic hierarchy. As such, it holds 
both the power and the responsibility for job site safety. The current research method 
attempted to provide a window into creating a dialogue for resolution and change relating 
to the relationships between leadership style and perceived climate of safety. It created 
the potential to offer insight and inspiration regarding the ways in which the construction 
industry can begin to understand itself as both part of the conflict as well as the solution, 
a solution that allows managers the ability to better adapt and adopt leadership styles that 
effectively meet the safety needs of those they were charged to protect, the worker.   
The construction workforce is tasked daily to engage in activities that, by the very 
nature of the industry, are potentially hazardous but do not need to be unsafe. By using 
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this research and that of future studies, this researcher hopes that it will stimulate 
discussion at all levels of construction safety management. This will allow for new means 
and methods to better manage and measure safety in a manner that addresses the most 
important aspect of any project, keeping the worker safe.  
This research is aligned with those characteristics that drive the field of Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution, specifically those focused on the facilitation of solutions that 
honor the opinions of all parties and recognize that systemic conflict like construction 
accidents do not manifest out of a single act or omission. This realization in turn allows 
for the emergence of informed leaders/managers who are better prepared to understand 
and address the needs of workers while permitting an environment for robust debate that 
must ultimately lead to the design and implementation of new ideas and models of safety 
that create links between production driven outcomes and the understanding that by 
acknowledging workers’ perception of climate of safety, there comes the potential for a 
reduction in workplace conflict(s) as well as an overall attenuation of safety related 
anxieties. 
Limitations of the Study  
The primary limitation of this study was related to the fact that the country’s 
workforce is not comprised solely of English speaking workers and thus may not be 
completely representative of the entire construction industry in the United States. To that 
end, this study was only made available to those proficient in English. While this is a 
recognized restriction, as noted early in this research, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2015) recognized that 27.3% of the construction workforce is Hispanic, which makes it 
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the largest ethnic minority in the industry. Yet, the assumption that all men and women in 
construction who identify as Hispanic are unable to read, write, or speak English at a 
level making them ineligible to partake in this study is a broad assumption. While 
distinctive and recognized by this researcher as a limitation, it is also his hope that future 
studies will include surveys offered in multiple languages.     
It is also acknowledged that this study was web-based, allowing only those with 
access to a Smart Device or computer with Internet access to participate.  This limitation 
is, according to Anderson (2015),  
68% of U.S. adults have a smartphone, up from 35% in 2011, and tablet computer 
ownership has edged up to 45% among adults, according to survey data from the 
Pew Research Center. Smartphone ownership is nearing the saturation point with 
some groups: 86% of those ages 18-29 have a smartphone, as do 83% of those 
ages 30-49 with 85.1% percent of American homes having some sort of computer 
with internet access. (para. 4) 
Another limitation was the fact that while this study tested relationships between 
leadership styles and perceived climate of safety, the relationships in and of themselves 
do not dictate causation. That is, this study did not seek to prove that certain leadership 
styles would not cause or lead to a safer climate of safety. Therefore, it was not meant to 
engender proof of any causal relationship, leaving this for future study. 
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Conclusion and Implications 
This dissertation was focused on the reality that current interventions and 
resources fall short of protecting the worker. While a core belief in worker safety 
continues to permeate the industry in theory, the job tasks performed (e.g. climate of 
safety) can be catastrophic, and fatal injuries continue to occur at an alarming rate. When 
first instituted into conventional construction safety management, it was agreed that 
safety must be a priority to successfully mitigate the potential for injury. This research 
understands that safety cannot be reconciled if it is addressed as an obscure concept, and 
workplace safety, safety management, and safety climate must be measured. It is a 
sentiment substantiated in the work of Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991), who specifically 
focused on finding ways in which to measure safety climate in an effort to decrease 
incident rates.  
Further evidence of the importance of continuing to carry out this kind of research 
was reflected in the work of Hinze, Hallowell, and Baud (2013), who argued that 
“accidents and injuries still occur repeatedly on sites and it appears [that] construction 
safety has hit a plateau” (p 139). What made this research unique was its focus on the 
need for awareness regarding the importance of understanding climate of safety. It 
emphasized the lack of research regarding the potential for creating newly designed 
proactive policies and procedures based on the perceptions of leadership styles and 
climate of safety. 
The literature review also reflected the need for recognizing that the root cause of 
any construction accident was complex, as a result of the multi-faceted nature of the 
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industry. The recognition also revealed that relying exclusively on secondary data is 
simply not the solution when exploring more effective means and methods to keep the 
worker safe. Despite the fact that accident statistics were historically relied upon 
throughout the construction industry, Laitinen, Marjamäki, and Keijo (1999) further 
elucidated that it was almost impossible to use accidents as a safety indicator for a single 
building construction site. They stated that “This is because of random variation where 
many sites will have no accidents, and it is not possible to determine whether these sites 
with zero accidents were safer than sites with accidents” (pp. 463-464).   
Therefore, as a result of the complexity of construction safety management and 
the inclusion of multiple trades and multi-organizational partnerships in the construction 
industry, this research offers new insights into the impediments that still exist 
systemically and obstruct the formation of an effective means of understanding the 
impact of management styles at the macro, mezzo and micro levels.  
Conflict analysis and the potential for resolution was the driving force for this 
research, as this is an industry in a struggle to make safety a priority without undermining 
fiscal gains. Safety cannot be seen as an obscure construct but instead, systemic models 
that embrace an information loop that supports dialogue from the top-down and bottom-
up. This research emphasizes that certain leadership styles are more suited to engender 
worker safety. Furthermore, both managers and workers consistently agree on the 
importance of a jobsite free of unsafe acts, unsafe conditions or a combination of both, 
while not yet fully aligned as a united front. 
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Appendix A: Cover Letter & Consent Form 
 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled  
CONSTRUCTION SAFETY: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF 
LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES ON PERCEIVED CLIMATE OF SAFETY AT THE 
CONSTRUCTION JOB SITE 
 
Funding Source: None 
 
IRB protocol 2017-20 
 
Joshua M. Estrin, MS    Jason Campbell, Ph.D. 
916 NE 16
th
 Ave.    3301 College Ave. 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304   Fort Lauderdale, FL  33314 
(954) 243-7436     (954) 262-3035  
 
For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: 
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)  
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790 
IRB@nsu.nova.edu 
 
What is the study about?  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate how management addresses job site safety. While the 
industry has made an effort to approach safety, the full potential to reduce the need to wait for the 
system to fail in order to successfully take action that keeps the worker out of harm’s way has 
been sorely under utilized. 
 
Why are you asking me? 
The reason for asking you to participate is to better understand how you view how safety is 
addressed by your supervisor and how safe you personally feel on the job site.  Approximately 
300 people (Management and Workers) will be taking this survey. 
 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
This survey is 100% anonymous and voluntary.  By agreeing to take part in this study you will be 
asked to spend approximately 15 to 20 minutes answering a series of 16 questions.   You are 
expected to answer the questions honestly and to the best of your ability by following the 
instructions.  
 
Is there any audio or video recording? 
None 
 
What are the dangers to me? 
While this research poses no likely dangers or risks to you, any study may have unknown or 
unforeseeable risks. If you have any questions about the research, your research rights, please 
contact [Joshua Estrin and/or Jason Campbell].  You may also contact the IRB at the numbers 
indicated above with questions as to your research rights."  
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Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study? 
There are no direct benefits. 
 
Will I get paid for being in the study?  Will it cost me anything? 
There are no costs to you or payments made for participating in this study. 
 
How will you keep my information private? 
None of the questions in any of the surveys require information that could be used to identify you. 
For a full explanation how the information in this survey is protected you may read the full 
privacy policy here https://www.surveymonkey.com/mp/policy/privacy-policy/ . 
 
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study? 
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide to 
leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or loss of services you 
have a right to receive.  If you choose to withdraw, any information collected about you before 
the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for 36 months from the 
conclusion of the study and may be used as a part of the research. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding the protection of your answers you may contact 
the Joshua Estrin, the lead researcher in this study at (954) 243-7436 or jestrin@nova.edu 
 
Other Considerations: 
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate to your 
willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you by the investigator. 
 
Voluntary Consent by Participant: 
By checking the box, you indicate that 
 this study has been explained to you 
 you have read this document or it has been read to you 
 your questions about this research study have been answered 
 you have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions in the 
future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury 
 you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel 
questions about your study rights 
 you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it 
you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled CONSTRUCTION SAFETY: A 
QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES ON 
PERCEIVED CLIMATE OF SAFETY AT THE CONSTRUCTION JOB SITE 
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